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Abstract:   Incorporating a qualitative approach, the purpose of this multiple case study 
dissertation was: 1) to explore the perceptions of threat assessment teams on campus 
safety; 2) to study the challenges and barriers two-year colleges experience in relation to 
the threat assessment team process; and 3) to describe how the teams’ perceptions of risk 
may influence decisions and team process as analyzed by the Group – Grid model of 
Cultural Theory. The participants of this study included professional staff and 
administrators from two different two-year colleges who have developed a threat 
assessment team on campus, referred to in the study as Brownsville State College and 
Redwood State College. Data collection methods included interviews and document and 
artifact analysis. 
The findings suggest that team members perceive the threat assessment team as not only 
a safety initiative, but also an opportunity to “help, not hinder” students in need of 
resources. Additionally, findings imply two-year colleges experience different challenges 
and barriers than their four-year counterparts because of a lack of resources for 
manpower, counseling resources, and group training. Through this study, the Cultural 
Theory’s Group-Grid lens was used to analyze the threat assessment teams at both 
institutions as Egalitarian Cultures (high group, low grid). This culture operates under a 
shared mission or purpose, self-intrinsic motives, individual job roles and ownership in 
team decisions. Recommendations for future research and implications for practice of 
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Campus safety continues to be a critical issue facing higher education administrators 
as violent events heighten fears of campus communities, parents, and outside stakeholders. 
Safety and security is a complex matter that includes a wide array of issues from violent 
events to less threatening concerns. These issues can range from campus shootings, sexual 
assaults, riots, stalking, suicide, burglary, disruptions in the classroom, drug/alcohol 
violations, hazing activities or students experiencing mental health issues just to name a few. 
Finding methods to address these diverse safety issues remains a challenge for college 
officials and stakeholders of the university. The university setting is unique as it is a large, 
spacious, open society both physically and symbolically. Many campuses sprawl over several 
miles spanning numerous multi-floor buildings, open spaces, athletic facilities, parking lots, 
residence halls, and other structures that make up the institution. In the event of a campus 
emergency, securing these spaces and notifying the community proves to be challenging. In 
relation to the commuter campus, it is not enough to notify only campus constituents. 
Notification of those en route to campus is also critical to warn of impending danger. 
Violent events on campus resulting in large loss of life, such as those that occurred at 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) and Northern Illinois 
University, highlight the need for more preventative measures to be employed by higher 
education to ensure the safety of campus constituents. One preventative measure that is being 
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implemented on college campuses nationwide as a best practice is the formation of threat 
assessment teams (Deisinger, Randazzo, O’Neill, & Savage, 2008; Sokolow, Lewis, Manzo, 
Schuster, Byrnes, & Van Brunt, 2011, & Van Brunt, 2012). Threat assessment team (TAT) is 
defined as “a multidisciplinary team that is responsible for the careful and contextual 
identification and evaluation of behaviors that raise concern and that may precede violent 
activity on campus” (Deisinger, Randazzo, O’Neill, & Savage, 2008, p. 5). These teams 
consist of a variety of names such as: behavior intervention team, behavior assessment team, 
students of concern, college concern team, threat assessment behavior intervention team, 
campus assessment team, or campus assessment response team. The United States Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Secret Service jointly recommend that colleges and 
universities implement threat assessment teams to serve as preventative measures in campus 
security (O’Toole, 2000; U.S. Secret Service, 2000). Threat assessment teams provide a 
benefit of a centralized reporting mechanism for the campus (Sokolow et al., 2011). This 
central information nerve system allows for the compilation of data coming from multiple 
resources such as faculty, counseling, campus police, student conduct, residential life, 
academic advising or other campus departments and aids the team to establish a baseline of 
behavior for the student. By establishing this baseline and communicating to one central team 
(TAT), the team monitors changes in behavior and accesses resources to aid the student in a 
more timely fashion (Sokolow et al., 2011). 
 Although the literature revolving on threat assessment teams is growing, most of the 
literature centers on the process and best practices of behavior intervention or threat 
assessment teams on the college campus. A current gap in the literature relates to 
understanding threat assessment at two-year institutions. Specifically, a gap exists concerning 
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the best practices that are critical and the challenges or barriers that a two-year college 
experiences with threat assessment. The purpose of this study was to explore the perceptions 
of how the threat assessment team contributes to campus safety and the perceived challenges 
and barriers two-year colleges may experience serving on serving on such teams.  
Background of Study 
Multiple school shootings in the 1990s led to a focus in the K-12 arena of how to 
provide safer schools by incorporating a variety of techniques aimed at prevention, 
deterrence, delay, respond and recover (Fitzgerald, 2013). The Secret Service, in conjunction 
with the US Department of Education, developed the Safe School Initiative in 2000, 
originally tasked to determine a school shooter profile. This study identified strategies for 
schools to implement to increase safety and violence awareness. Although this initiative did 
not find consistent characteristics for a shooter profile, the report did provide multiple 
recommendations for school administrators to increase safety and prevention of violence 
including the formation of threat assessment teams (O’Toole, 2000). The creation of these 
teams aided institutions to identify threats, assess creditability, and manage these scenarios 
where applicable (O’Toole, 2000). 
Colleges and universities were not immune to violent events that tragically occur over 
time. Although multiple violent events transpired on campuses throughout history, the events 
of Virginia Tech in 2007 and shortly afterwards at Northern Illinois University in 2008, 
sounded the alarm for changes in communication efforts, prevention measures, and 
collaboration within the campus community to address safety and security on campus. The 
Virginia Tech incident resulted in large loss of life, with 32 deaths reported. Specifically, the 
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Virginia Tech incident gave appearances of chaotic school security response, and a lack of 
coordinated case management of students of concern (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007). 
 Each time these violent events transpired, cries for mental health services on campus, 
oversight to monitor at risk students, and concerns for campus safety became more prevalent 
(Fischman & Ferrell, 2008; Hermes, 2008; Mangan, 2007). Relying solely on campus 
counseling centers to direct case management failed to provide a realistic solution for 
campuses (Gallagher, 2009). Furthermore, some college students declined to self-identify to 
campus counseling centers about their mental health diagnosis or that they needed help 
(Vogel, Gentile, & Kaplan, 2008; Vogel, Wade, & Hackler, 2008). 
Threat assessment is a deductive process focused on identifying, researching, 
evaluating, and managing threatening or troubling behaviors in persons of concern    
(Sokolow et al., 2011; O’Toole, 2000; U.S. Secret Service, 2000; Van Brunt, 2012). This 
provides a preventative strategy to possibly mitigate violent activity on campus. Threat 
assessment operates under the assumption that it will break down silos on campus and 
increase communication about students or persons of concern. Additionally, the inclusion of 
professionals from various areas across campus provides a more complete picture to 
managing a student of concern. By incorporating a central reporting structure, an overall 
picture of the student may emerge when inquiring about a specific issue.  
Virginia Tech found that many on campus had experienced disturbing events 
concerning Seung Hui Cho. Beginning when he first arrived on campus years earlier, Cho’s 
behavior caused alarm for numerous individuals. His mental state deteriorated during his 
time at Virginia Tech. Cho demonstrated multiple warning signs of his downward spiral, 
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however many were missed by campus professionals. According to Deisinger et al. (2008), 
“the information was scattered throughout different departments and personnel on campus. 
No one person or entity at the Virginia Tech campus knew all the available pieces of 
information (p. 16).   
The purpose of threat assessment teams is to aid the campus community in 
identifying, investigating, evaluating and managing behaviors of concern (Deisinger et al., 
2008; Randazzo & Cameron, 2011; Randazzo & Plummer, 2009). By incorporating the use 
of these teams, a person capable of conducting a violent scenario may be confronted at a 
lower level on the continuum of violence, possibly saving lives and providing the needed 
help to the student of concern. 
Second Generation Threat Assessment Teams 
 Sokolow and Lewis (2009) found common threads in threat assessment teams 
established Pre-Virginia Tech. They found these teams operated as informal groups within a 
narrow scope. Specifically, these teams only focused on the immediate problem failing to 
consider or communicate with other campus entities to obtain a complete picture of the 
student. The authors suggested these first generation teams solved the current issue and then 
moved attention to the next problem or crisis. These early teams failed to utilize tracking 
mechanisms of incidents and students. This allowed little opportunity for finding trends in 
behavior either individually or within the collective student body. Threat assessment teams 
adapted to better address the intricacies of student violence and mental health by changing 
the identifying methods of the reporting structure. Consequently, second generation threat 
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assessment team evolved to include identifiable characteristics. Sokolow and Lewis (2009) 
suggested these characteristics include the following: 
 Use of formalized protocols of explicit engagement techniques and strategies 
 Recognize role is to address threat and primarily to support and provide resources to 
students 
 Utilize mandated psychological assessment 
 Have the authority to invoke involuntary medical/psychological withdrawal policies 
 Undergirded by sophisticated threat assessment capacity, beyond law enforcement 
and psychological assessment tools 
 Use of rubrics to classify threats 
 Foster a comprehensive reporting culture within the institution 
 Train and educate the community on what to report and how 
 Technologically advanced and supported by comprehensive databases that allow the 
team to have a longitudinal view of a student’s behavior patterns and trends 
 Focus not only student-based risks, but on faculty and staff as well 
 Intentionally integrate with campus risk management programs and risk mitigation 
strategies 
 Have a mechanism for “minding the gap” (Sokolow and Lewis, 2009, p. 4) 
These characteristics represented a significant difference between first and second generation 
threat assessment teams. As threat assessment teams are incorporated on campuses across the 





Cultural Theory of Risk, known as Cultural Theory (CT), serves as the theoretical 
framework for analyzing data. Douglas and Wildavasky’s  (1982) CT concentrates on risk 
perception and interpretation to address how societal groups assess risk assignment to various 
cultural issues. CT operates with the assumption that the “culture is a system that holds one 
another mutually accountable” (Douglas, 1992, p. 31). Douglas and Wildavsky suggest that 
people, groups, or systems choose what to fear in relation to their cultural biases (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982). Furthermore, CT functions with the understanding that shared values and 
beliefs bind individuals together within culture and groups (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; 
Wildavsky, 1987). CT attempts to answer two foundational questions: Who am I and what 
shall I do? These questions aid individuals in determining to which groups they belong. 
These cultural biases are identified in Cultural Theory as hierarchal, egalitarian, individualist, 
or fatalist. These four viewpoints will be discussed further below. 
 Additionally, CT argues that no one person can pinpoint risk accurately. Douglas and 
Wildavsky (1982) maintain that risk is subjective due to the following factors: 1) 
disagreements about the problem, 2) inconsistencies in identifying problems and 3) 
contradictions between knowledge of the problem and actual action plans to address and 
mitigate the risk.  All four cultural biases emerge when attempting to solve problems. When 
consideration of all four viewpoints occurs, a solution to the problem will materialize. 
Specifically, Douglas’ Group-Grid Model provides a visual of how organizations push 
individuals to conform to the culture of the institution either by choice or circumstance 




Within the Group-Grid Model, the group segment on the horizontal access provides 
the external boundary for members of the community. This axis signifies the loyalty and 
commitment required to be a part of the group. The grid on the vertical axis represents the 
regulation the group accepts within the organization. This measurement of structure ranges 
from no control to a strong, hierarchal organization (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). The 
Group-Grid Model divides into four quadrants representing cultural bias: hierarchical, 
egalitarian, individualists, and fatalists. People or organizations encompass all four biases 











Figure 1. Mary Douglas Group-Grid Cultural Map (1982) 
Fatalists:  High grid, low 
group; Isolates by choice, 
stands alone in structured 
group 
Hierarchical: High grid, 
high group; Values order, 
strong groups and strong 
organizational structure 
Individualists: Low grid, low 
group; Rejects structure and 
values competition, weak 
group and weak 
organizational structure 
Egalitarian: Low grid, high 
group; Values equality 
among members and 










 The four cultural biases, or views about how the world should operate, support and 
uphold individual mindset for how problems should be solved and what relationships should 
be valued. The four viewpoints remain in constant struggle for dominance (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982; Ney & Verweijr, 2014).  Hierarchical cultures value tradition, order, and 
structure. This worldview esteems expert opinions in decision-making and problem-solving 
scenarios. Hierarchists value strong groups with complex structures over individual needs. 
They face social problems by focusing on policy, procedures, expert opinions, and 
establishing authority (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Ney & Verweijr, 2014). Hierarchical 
cultural bias functions in the high group, high grid quadrant of the group-grid model. 
 Consequently, individualist culture devalues tradition and holds competition in high 
regard. Individualist cultures have weak structures and weak groups. This viewpoint believes 
a leadership position is earned by ability or skill. Individualists prefer to focus on social 
problems by employing market based solutions that highlight competition instead of 
concentrating on experts and governing rules as the hierarchists. Individualists hold personal 
liberty in the highest regard (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Ney & Verweijr, 2014). 
Individualist cultures operate in the low group, low grid quadrant in the group-grid model. 
 Douglas identifies the third cultural bias identified as the egalitarian culture. 
Egalitarians hold high group values but are weak in structure. The equality of members holds 
the utmost importance for this cultural bias. Egalitarians attain this primary goal by imposing 
a strong sense of rules for the group. They revere equality of all in society higher than order 
or personal liberty. Equality of the group allows for order but not for status or function 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Ney & Verweijr, 2014; Wildavsky & Drake, 1990). 
10 
 
Egalitarian cultural bias operates in the high group, low grid quadrant of the group-grid 
model. 
Douglas notes the last cultural bias noted as the fatalist viewpoint.  This culture does 
not choose to assimilate to any group or structure. They rarely include themselves in groups 
and lack any action to collaborate with other groups. Fatalists perceive themselves as having 
little power; therefore they accept the answer provided by others. They choose isolation 
without anticipation or expectation to either lead or follow (Douglas, 2006). Fatalists provide 
no solutions to group problems due to the lack of contribution or collaborative efforts with 
other members as they believe fate is in control (Ney & Verweijr, 2014). The fatalist cultural 
bias performs in the low group, high grid quadrant of the group-grid model. 
Various policy studies utilized Cultural Theory (CT) within studies of risk perception 
from environmental pollution to threats connected to nuclear factories (Douglas, 1982). 
Recently, studies utilized Cultural Theory to address risk perception in collaboration of 
advocacy groups, affordable housing in Los Angeles, Supreme Court gender cases,  
childhood vaccination, and the perceptions of experts and political framing (Lachapelle, 
Montpetit, & Gauvin, 2014; Ney & Werweijr, 2014; Robinson, 2014; Song, Silva, & 
Jenkins-Smith, 2014; Weare, Lichterman, & Esparaza, 2014). Weare, Lichterman, and 
Esparaza (2014) studied the role of cultural bias in a case study of collaborative network 
agencies brought together in Los Angeles to address the affordable housing problem. This 
study observed a 145 organizational member network over a period of two years. Over time, 
the coalition began to fracture because of difference about how to developing and 
implementing plans to solve the problem. Weare, Lichterman, and Esparaza (2014) found 
that cultural bias embedded in group structures caused tension to arise due to these 
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competing worldviews. Furthermore, this study found that these biases contributed to 
member recruitment, retention as well as hindered alliances even when the coalition has the 
same end goal (Weare, Lichterman, & Esparaza, 2014). The study supported CT’s posit that 
the four worldviews or cultural biases compete with each other for dominance. Wildavsky 
further explained, “The cultural hypothesis is that individuals exert control over each other 
by institutionalizing the moral judgments justifying their impersonal relationships so they can 
be acted upon and accounted for” (Wildavsky, 1987, p.8). The Weare study supported CT’s 
theory that the four worldviews or cultural biases compete with each other for dominance 
(Weare, Lichterman, & Esparaza, 2014). 
Likewise, Song, Silva and Jenkins-Smith (2014) studied childhood immunization and 
vaccination policies in the United States to inquire if CT worldviews held true to this subject. 
There were 1,213 subjects who agreed to participate in this study. The survey included over 
100 questions focusing on vaccination practices, benefits of vaccination, and preferences of 
government regulations. This study found that preferences concerning vaccination are 
“significantly impacted” by cultural bias (Song, Silva, & Jenkins-Smith, 2014, p. 542). 
Moreover, the study concluded that the vaccine debate is less about disease eradication and 
more about the dissension of worldviews, values, and beliefs colliding. As individuals 
received new knowledge, they decoded the data through the lens tied to their cultural bias for 
making decisions and analysis (Song, Silva, & Jenkins-Smith, 2014). 
Lachapelle, Montpetit, and Gauvin (2014) added to the discussion with their study of 
public perceptions of expert creditability. Specifically, the researchers observed how the 
function of cultural bias and message framing should be informed decision-making. The 
authors found that expert credentials are not the sole source of trust and creditability in 
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perception of risk. Instead, an individual’s worldview informed the decisions in conjunction 
with the expert creditability (Lachapelle, Montpetit, & Gauvin, 2014). 
Wildavsky suggested that risk perception and risk aversion coincide with the level of 
trust each organization or person has in an institution (Wildavsky, 1987). Likewise, CT stated 
that perception of risk is tied to political choice, but individuals or groups shunned dangers 
that appear to be forced upon them (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Several studies of elitist 
populations on topics such as safety of nuclear power plants, public policy, and political 
alliances found that highly educated individuals are divided on perception of risk, regardless 
of communicated danger by experts (Bloomgarden, 1983; Kalt & Zupan, 1984; Rothman & 
Lichter, 1985; Sussman, 1986). These perceptions can be explained by the cultural 
viewpoints previously discussed in CT. Individuals who value structure and order appeared 
to minimize risk associated with technological advances. However, when the issue of 
concern encompassed autonomy or equality in the workplace, individualist and egalitarians 
were more sensitive, rating these items higher in risk perception (Bloomington, 1983; 
Wildavsky, 1987; Wildavsky & Drake, 1990).  
By looking at the data through this lens, it highlighted how institutional leadership 
and team members assigned risk to issues of concern. This theory may also be beneficial to 
understanding how institutional culture addressed issues of risk management, resource 
management, leadership, communication and conflict resolution. Additionally, this 
framework enabled me to explore characteristics of the aforementioned biases assigned to the 





 Higher education continues to investigate preventative strategies to implement on 
campus with hopes of decreasing incidents of violence. Administrators, regents, trustees, and 
legislators utilize the recommendations by the U.S. Secret Service and the FBI to incorporate 
threat assessment teams into campus emergency plans (Vossekuil et al., 2002; O’Toole, 
2000). As threat assessment is embraced by institutions, various organizations promote best 
practices for creation of these teams.  Established best practices for campus threat assessment 
teams identifies that the inclusion of specific campus professionals, written policy, and team 
training are critical for an effective and multi-disciplinary approach in identifying, 
investigating, evaluating, and managing a person of concern on college campuses (Cornell, 
2010; Deisinger et al., 2008; Randazzo & Cameron, 2011; Sokolow et al., 2011; Van Brunt, 
2012). Effective teams include representatives from student conduct, campus security, mental 
health counseling, and the dean of students or student affairs. Other campus professionals are 
also included, although the previously mentioned members represent core membership of 
threat assessment teams (Sokolow et al., 2011; Van Brunt, 2012). Likewise, written policy 
and training team members allows for members to have the appropriate resources to increase 
the knowledge base to conduct campus threat assessment effectively.  Consequently, two-
year colleges may not include critical membership components, written policies and 
processes, or member training in threat assessment team development as recommended by 
best practices for successful team operation (Cornell, 2010; Randazzo & Cameron, 2011; 
Sokolow et al., 2011; Van Brunt, 2012). Limited resources at two-year colleges hinder 





1. What is the perception of threat assessment teams’ impact on the current state of 
campus safety on two-year college campuses? 
2. How do threat assessment team members at two-year colleges describe perceived 
challenges or barriers for the threat assessment process? 
3. How does the threat assessment team member’s perception of risk shape the threat 
assessment process at the institution? 
Significance 
 Campus safety remains a concern for higher education operations. As violent events 
continue to occur on college campuses across the nation, higher education continues to look 
for ways to implement prevention methods against these types of incidents. Although 
information is available concerning TAT best practices and processes, the literature provides 
little qualitative or empirical data on the topic. Additionally, most research addresses higher 
education at the four-year level and does not focus on the two-year school perspective. This 
research may be important because the two-year campus brings different challenges from the 
four-year selective admission counterparts. Most two-year institutions engage in an open 
admission process providing an opportunity for a wider berth of the general population to 
attend college. According to the American Association of Community Colleges (AACC), 
12.4 million students seeking both credit and non-credit programs attend two-year 
institutions (American Association of Community Colleges, 2015). This figure represents 46 
percent of all college students in the United States (American Association of Community 
Colleges, 2015). Most students enter the college setting with various challenges regardless of 
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college choice. However, students attending two-year institutions differ in socioeconomic 
status, race, age, family background, and work status.  
In 2013-2014, the American Association of Community Colleges reported that 33 
percent of all students at two-year colleges received Pell grants and 21 percent received 
Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grants (American Association of Community 
Colleges, 2015). The two-year college student, with average age of 28, entered college with 
added life stressors and smaller or non-existent support systems. Issues such as family 
pressure, financial struggles, balancing time between work and school requirements all 
served as sources of emotional unrest and some two-year students do not know where to turn 
to find resources (Eisenberg et al., 2016). These life stressors, combined with the added 
pressure of college classes, increase the risks for students to be unsuccessful in their quest of 
becoming college graduates. The resources available at two-year colleges fail to meet the 
diverse needs of the student body.  
This study is significant because it will provide more data to the growing literature of 
threat assessment, specifically data about threat assessment at the two-year college. This 
study explored the perceptions of threat assessment teams on campus safety, as well as 
challenges and barriers two-year colleges experience. Likewise, the data were analyzed 
according to the Cultural Theory lens to further study how a teams’ perception of risk may 
influence decisions and team processes. Because of the underlying importance of the threat 
assessment strategy to campus safety, this study may be beneficial to understanding the 
teams’ perceptions of how the process works at the two-year campus and if there are any 
gaps in operating according to best practice. 
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Overview of Methodology 
 Different research design strategies helped me to explore, examine, or discover 
possible answers to inquiries. The study design incorporated my worldview of knowledge 
into all aspects of the research process. I viewed knowledge from a constructivist worldview, 
therefore design choices for this study aligned with this viewpoint. Crotty (1998) stated that 
the constructivist epistemology operates under the assumption that knowledge or reality is 
constructed by the individual. I considered the participants’ understandings of the topic of 
utmost importance. Therefore, multiple meanings and understandings can be applied to a 
single event. To best complement this view of knowledge, the qualitative methodology was 
incorporated to aid me in exploring multiple meanings and understandings of the subjects 
and their realities (Crotty, 1998). These preferences applied to the methodology, theoretical 
frameworks, design, research problem, research question, purpose, and methods of the 
research process.  
 Qualitative research provided multiple design methodologies to best attain the data 
needed to conduct the study.  Yin (2009) stated the case study is best used when researching 
a current phenomenon within a present time period. He advised the use of the case study 
design when asking questions of ‘how’ or ‘why’ (Yin, 2009). Likewise, the case study data 
collection methods utilized a more natural approach to collecting data in the field with the 
use of interviews, artifact analysis, and observations. This study employed a multiple case 




 This study involved two separate two-year college campuses in a Midwestern state. 
All two-year college campus members of the state’s higher education system were notified of 
the study, however only two institutions were selected.  Patton (2020) noted that qualitative 
research focuses on depth, not breadth of the study. The selected institutions were studied 
extensively to provide rich, detailed information for analysis. Each participating institution 
identified the designated administrator assigned to threat assessment and two members for 
the member interviews. This provided the study a total of six possible participants for 
interviews. 
 Methods to collect data reflected the qualitative methodology in this study, 
specifically the constructivist epistemology. Data collection primarily utilized personal 
interviews and I served as the primary research tool. Interview guides were used to assure 
consistency in the type of questions asked to participants. Follow-up interviews were 
conducted as needed to clarify or continue data collection with participants. Furthermore, the 
document and artifact analysis were also incorporated into this study. This data stream 
allowed analysis for congruency in word, both spoken and written, and action by the 
institution. Documents and artifacts collected included webpage screen shots, written 
institutional policy, campus safety and security reports, and relevant newspaper clippings. 
Combining all the data collected from the various data sources served to triangulate the 
information. This helped to address the trustworthiness and validity of the data for this 
qualitative study. Likewise, all transcripts were checked for accuracy by submitting 




 I utilized multiple techniques for data analysis to provide opportunities for categories 
and themes to emerge from the collected data.  I evaluated and coded all the transcribed 
interviews by common themes across data streams. Initial open coding helped to identify 
common words, topics, and themes as entered into MaxQDA12.  Deeper analysis exercises 
were applied by incorporating Emerson’s Members Meaning techniques (2011). These 
techniques are discussed further in the methodology chapter of this study. Likewise, all 
transcripts were examined to determine if critical incidents served as a catalyst in threat 
assessment team formation on campus. Furthermore, the Culture of Risk theory served as the 
theoretical framework to inform data analysis as to how these threat assessment groups work 
over a variety of functions. A complete description of the methodology utilized for this study 
can be found in Chapter III.  
Delimitations and Definitions 
 This study was conducted during the fall 2015 semester when enrollment is typically 
higher than the spring or summer semesters. The fall semester also assured that full team 
membership was available, as some faculty membership may not be present on campus 
during the summer months. The participants included administrators and threat assessment 
team members from two-year higher education institutions in a Midwestern state. The threat 
assessment team members were comprised of a variety of key higher education positions 
across campus critical to the threat assessment team process. In the instance an institution did 
not have a threat assessment team or in the process of beginning a threat assessment team, 
they were ineligible for inclusion in the study. 
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As this study was qualitative in nature, findings were not to be considered for 
generalizability to the population. Therefore, a large sample size was not the priority in this 
study design. Because depth is the goal for qualitative data, collecting rich, descriptive data 
was favored. Therefore, a smaller sample was selected for this study to focus on gathering 
multiple layers of data for analysis. Two institutions were selected for inclusion in this case 
study and multiple interviews conducted at the site to provide the depth needed to satisfy 
qualitative inquiry. Participants included the delegated administrators and four team 
members for a possible total of six participants in the study. 
Definition of Terms 
Threat assessment – behavior-based, deductive process comprised of a) learning of a person 
posing a threat; b) gathering information about the person from multiple sources; c) 
evaluating if that person poses a threat of violence towards others; and d) developing 
and implementing an individualized plan to reduce the threat (Deisinger, et al., 2008). 
Profiling – comparing an individual to a profile or composite of previous attackers 
 (Randazzo & Cameron, 2012) 
Threat assessment teams (TAT) – a multidisciplinary team that is responsible for the  
careful and contextual identification and evaluation of behaviors that raise concern 
and that may precede violent activity of campus (Deisinger et al., 2008) May also be 
referred to as CARE teams, Behavior Intervention Teams (BIT), Behavior Care Team 
(BCT), Campus Behavior Assessment Team, (BCAT), Risk Assessment Team 
(RAT), or other synonyms developed by individual institutions  
Violence – behavior that is by intent, action, and/or outcome harmful to another person  
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 (Nicoletti, Spencer-Thomas, & Bollinger, 2010) 
Active shooter – an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in  
 a confined and populated area (Blair & Schweit, 2014, p. 5) 
Student of concern – a student who may pose a threat of violence (Sokolow, et al,  
 2011; Van Brunt, 2013; Vossekuil et al., 2002) 
Resources – fiscal monies, employee assignment, trainings, software or other resources 
 provided to TAT by the institution 
Risk – a probability or threat of damage, injury, liability, loss, or any other negative  
 occurrence that is caused by external or internal vulnerabilities 
 (Black Law Dictionary, 2004, p.1353) 
Summary 
 This chapter served to introduce the research problem and questions foundational to 
this study. Furthermore, a brief background of the problem provided a contextual frame for 
the research problem as to the type of events that led to threat assessment teams being 
recommended to higher education as a preventative strategy for violence on campus. The 
theoretical framework that is central to this study was also introduced. This chapter also 
served to define common terms that are important to this study for clarification purposes. 
Likewise, a brief overview of the research methodology that was used in this inquiry has 
been documented. The next chapter provides a literature review encompassing several 










 The purpose of this case study is to explore the perceptions of what TAT’s 
contribute to campus safety; and to study the perceived training and resources provided to 
TAT’s. Therefore, the literature review addresses campus violence in general, lessons 
learned from the K-12 arena, public policy implications, overview of university 
counseling, and finally best practices and legal considerations of threat assessment teams 
for higher education institutions.  
Campus security continues to be a critical issue for all internal and external 
stakeholders of colleges and universities, including parents of current and future students. 
Campus safety and security involves a wide-range of issues such as marginal student 
conduct issues, hazing, sexual assault, student suicide and mass shootings (Nicoletti, 
Spencer-Thomas, & Bollinger, 2010). Serious security issues on campus result in media 
scrutiny by the public, leading outsiders to question or criticize administrative decisions 
made under duress (Hartle, 2011; Hoover & Lipka, 2007; Moxley, 2012).  However, 
there are lessons to be learned from past mistakes. Each campus tragedy brings reflection, 
inspection, and evaluation of campus safety policies and procedures. Furthermore, since 
the massacre at Virginia Tech, where Seung-Hui Cho (Cho) stormed the university 
killing 32 individuals and himself, campuses across the nation continue to develop 
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policies and practices for threat assessment teams. Prevention and intervention remains 
the goal of threat assessment teams in relation to persons of concern.   
Higher education history included many examples of guiding, shepherding, and 
disciplining students on the college campus. Initially, the in loco parentis philosophy 
ruled the college campus for centuries. The In loco parentis tenet originated out of 
English law giving faculty the ability to stand in the absence of parental supervision 
(Bickle & Lake, 1999).  This principle placed the university in direct authority over the 
student upon enrollment. Additionally, it served the university by providing a strict, 
draconian disciplinary code to keep order.  The in loco parentis paradigm came to a halt 
over several legal cases challenging the legality of higher education’s control over the 
student on campus. In Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education (1960), a landmark 
case, the courts awarded students a right to due process before an institution could 
dismiss students from the university (Bickle & Lake, 1999; Kaplin & Lee, 2007).  The 
courts viewpoint continued to change as it ruled over different cases. These court rulings 
moved the pendulum of responsibility from institution to student. More recent court 
rulings favored a shared responsibility between students and the institution. Colleges and 
universities implemented threat assessment teams to serve as a preventive safety measure 
and to mitigate portions of this shared responsibility.    
 This literature review began by examining the well-publicized examples of 
violence and threats on college campuses. Secondly, research of public policy concerning 
campus safety served to survey the policies developed by institutions or legislative bodies 
to address the issues of security.  Likewise, the inclusion of the counseling literature 
helped to gain further comprehension of trends in university counseling and student 
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issues when accessing campus counseling services. Additionally, this highlighted the 
importance of understanding the relevance of the counselor role on threat assessment 
teams. Finally, literature related to threat assessment explored the relationship of campus 
security and team formation. Specifically, the included threat assessment literature 
highlighted the best practices involved in developing campus action teams. 
Search Process 
Multiple sources were accessed to analyze the current body of literature relevant 
to this study. The search process for this literature review began with a general scan of 
the literature through the ERIC, EBSCOE, and JSTOR databases utilizing Boolean search 
terms. These searches included the following terms: mental health, counseling center, 
college trends, student conduct, higher education, college, public policy, active school 
shooter, school safety measures, threats, community college student, perception of safety 
and threat assessment teams. Additionally, searches of the PROQUEST database 
provided pertinent dissertations on threat assessment teams and active shooters. Searches 
of the Lexis Nexis database allowed for relevant legal cases and case law to address legal 
considerations for threat assessment teams. All sources were read and analyzed for 
possible significance to the study. Bibliographies for all sources were examined for 
relevant articles that were appropriate to this study. Applicable articles were further 
analyzed for use as primary resources. Finally, all articles were studied and integrated 





Campus Violence and Threats 
 For most of society, college brings visions of academic preparation and personal 
development to prepare individuals to become contributing citizens in the workforce. The 
college campus functions as a place of learning. It also serves as an environment that 
includes various safety issues requiring awareness and prevention. Consequently, 
colleges experience increased media scrutiny as violent acts have plagued a number of 
campuses throughout the nation.  
The deadliest and most horrific incident occurred on April 16, 2007 when Cho 
shot and killed 32 members of the Virginia Tech campus community (Virginia Tech 
Panel Review, 2007). Within a year, Steve Kazmierczak violently made Northern Illinois 
University a part of this evolving history by killing five and injuring eighteen in another 
campus shooting on February 14, 2008 (Kaminski, Koons-Witt, Thompson, & Weiss, 
2010). Although these two deadly events are seared into the minds of many, multiple 
incidents referenced violence throughout the history of higher education. 
 Although it is common to recall shootings, violence on campus encompasses 
many types of incidents in a variety of locations. These places includes parking lots, 
fraternity and/or sorority houses, residence halls, academic buildings, commons areas, or 
any other campus space (Carr & Ward, 2005; Nicoletti, Spencer-Thomas, & Bollinger, 
2010). Types of violence on campus may involve homicides, suicides, sexual assaults, 
hate crimes, hazing, arson, bombings, and non-sexual assaults (Carr, 2005; Nicoletti, 
Spencer-Thomas, and Bollinger, 2010; Whitaker & Pollard, 1993).  Whenever a campus 
experiences a violent act, the affected community displays a variety of numerous 
25 
 
emotional responses. These events may also impact the learning environment (Cornell, 
2008; Nicoletti, Spencer-Thomas, & Bollinger, 2010; Whitaker & Pollard, 1993). 
Victims of violent crimes may experience difficulties integrating back into the classroom 
or living environments, or may leave school altogether. These incidents impact 
roommates, friends, or unknown individuals who may relate to the victim by shared 
interests or characteristics such as religious affiliation, gender, or race. Likewise, the 
investigations require an increased demand of time and energy and may affect faculty and 
staff negatively (Whitaker & Pollard, 1993).  The ripple effects of campus violence may 
reach future students and stakeholders.  
 Understanding how violence affects the campus community aids institutions in 
developing comprehensive programming for violence prevention initiatives.  In order to 
make accurate planning initiatives, understanding historical violent campus events 
becomes advantageous. These events categorize to different typologies of violence as 
motives differ by perpetrator. 
 By incorporating a broader view of campus violence, institutions can better 
prepare prevention strategies to avert campus violence. Nicolletti, Spencer-Thomas, & 
Bollinger (2010), relate campus violence to an ever-evolving virus that continues to 
morph and grow according to the changing circumstance. The authors present four types 
of violent offenders and maintain understanding the motives and reasoning for each type 
changes the prevention strategy to counter the techniques employed to commit violence. 
These four types include predator, avenger, relation-based and group-based violence. 
These typologies categorize violence by motives such as power, sex, money, righting 
perceived injustices, or diffused responsibility (Nicolletti et al., 2010). 
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Universities may assess safety and security situations differently and more 
accurately by considering the type of threat and end goal of perpetrators. The study of 
past events provides campuses with the knowledge of warning signs and prevention 
techniques to best curb violent incidents. However, it is important to note, violence does 
not always predicate a threat.  
Although violent acts on a campus such as campus shootings are the most feared, 
threats for the college community entail more issues. Nationally, suicide is the “leading 
cause of death among college and university students … in addition many others have 
suicidal thoughts and attempt suicide” (Schwartz, 2011, p.353). A student in crisis 
disrupts the college environment more frequently leading to the threat assessment process 
being activated to address these concerns. Drug and alcohol abuse by college students 
affects areas such as residential life and academics. Dating and domestic violence, 
stalking and sexual assaults provide more frequent safety concerns for colleges and 
universities as one in five women are victims of sexual violence (Black, Basile, 
Brieiding, Smith, Walter, Merrick & Stevens, 2011). Normally, sexual assault cases are 
managed by student conduct; however the aftermath of these situations could include the 
threat assessment team. Additionally, issues such as disruptions in the classroom interrupt 
classroom learning and can escalate to threatening situations. Students who struggle with 
mental health disorders or post-traumatic stress disorder also may provide challenges for 
colleges and universities. All of these examples are scenarios that can ultimately be 
reported to threat assessment teams. Threat assessment helps to identify and manage a 
concern before it meets high levels of violence. However, knowing what could occur and 




 School and campus safety issues, specifically incidents of violence, led to public 
policy discussions on a national level. After the Clery murder at Lehigh University, 
accurate reporting of campus crimes became the focus of policy dialogue. These policy 
discussions led to changes in laws to better address the problem. Thus, the Jeanne Clery 
Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act of 1990 (Clery 
Act), passed by Congress, required annual reporting of campus crime statistics.  In the 
1990s, as school shootings warranted media attention, Congress passed the GFSZA of 
1994 to curb the growing violent trends on school grounds. This act prohibited guns on 
school grounds and was originally created to deter gang violence by incorporating zero 
tolerance policies (Gun Free School Zone Act, 1994). This study did not address the 
issues of violence within the K-12 arena, however this comparison provided another 
example of how public policy was used to address incidents of violence. After 
experiencing incidents of violence, Virginia, Northern Illinois and Connecticut required 
schools and universities to implement threat assessment teams through state legislations 
(Bennett & Bates, 2015). Birkland and Lawrence (2009) argued that the events such as 
Virginia Tech had little effect on lasting public policy. For example, following the violent 
incidents at Virginia Tech and Northern Illinois, the public policy conversations 
commanded center stage. The discussions centered on topics such as mental health, 
student privacy, campus notification/timely warning, and campus safety. However, 
Birkland and Lawrence (2009) stated society and the media were more concerned with 
the causes of violence and not preventing violence. They further argued that strategies 
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promoted as new, were actually policies and procedures already in place, while the 
underlying issues of violence was largely ignored.  
Higher Education Policy 
Higher education continues to witness the impact of campus violence in public 
policy with the implementation of the Clery Act, formally known as the Campus Security 
Act. This act addresses the reporting of crimes, both on campus and surrounding areas to 
the Department of Education. The Clery Act requires institutions that participate in 
federal student financial aid programs to disclose crime statistics for the last three 
academic years (Clery Center for Security on Campus, 2012). The origins of this act 
dates back to the Lehigh University murder of Jeanne Clery.  
Clery’s parents were outraged to learn campus violence had gone unreported by 
Lehigh University. The Clery’s believed administration feared how crime would impact 
college recruitment and enrollment over the safety of students. Due to their diligence, 
higher education institutions were required to report campus safety statistics annually. 
Colleges and universities were mandated to make these security reports available for 
parents, students, and the general public to view on websites and through the Department 
of Education (DOE). Additionally, the Clery Act required campuses to maintain incident 
logs, provide timely notice of campus crimes, assure rights of victims of sexual assault, 
provide campus emergency plans, afford protection to whistleblowers, educate students 
about hate crimes, collect and disseminate fire data annual report, and develop policies to 
address missing students (Jeanne Clery Act, 2008). 
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Similar to the tragedy at Columbine, the violent shootings at Virginia Tech and 
Northern Illinois University served as a catalyst for action and change in higher 
education. Multiple task forces met to assess and make recommendations for campus 
safety in states such as New York, Virginia, Florida, Ohio, North Carolina, and 
Oklahoma (Fox & Savage, 2009; Governor McDonnell's Taskforce for School and 
Campus Safety, 2008; Gubernatorial Task Force for University Campus Safety, 2007; 
North Carolina Department of Justice, 2007; Oklahoma State Regents for Higher 
Education, 2008; Ohio Board of Regents, 2007). These task forces assessed all individual 
state member institutions for services such as safety and security, mental health, 
emergency notification, funding, and policies currently in place. Although conducted in 
multiple states, common recommendations emerged stating the need for increased mental 
health services, communication within and across departmental units, and more 
emergency notification systems. The Clery Act served as a post-event reporting 
mechanism. However, Bolante and Dykeman (2015) stated that the Clery Act proves 
relevant for threat assessment where crime statistics and threat assessment cases intersect 
as “an overlap of reported cases within Clery and threat assessment, but not all threat 
assessment will be Clery” (p. 30). 
Implications for FERPA. Interestingly, policy and mental health services 
dominated the discussion following the Virginia Tech tragedy in task force work group 
meetings. Under investigation by the DOE, Virginia Tech officials contested the criticism 
leveled at the institution citing issues with the Family Education Records and Privacy Act 
(FERPA) as reasons they failed to disclose student information (Virginia Tech Review 
Panel, 2008). A student’s rights are guaranteed by FERPA giving them the right to access 
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their educational records, a process to request an amendment to their record, and ensures 
privacy of their record unless disclosure permission (Family Education Records and 
Privacy Act, 1974).  Within FERPA, the DOE defined what qualifies as an educational 
record. Equally, FERPA identified records that are exempted from educational records 
status.  These records included law enforcement records, treatment records, personal 
notes, or information stored in an individual’s mind, and student employment records 
(Family Education Records and Privacy Act, 1974).  
Virginia Tech claimed campus officials were not privy to critical information due 
to confusion over what student information could be shared with other campus 
professionals and what student records fell into an exempt status (Virginia Tech Review 
Panel, 2007). Campus safety and security task forces also pointed to misunderstandings 
of FERPA concerning student privacy (Governor McDonnell's Taskforce for School and 
Campus Safety, 2008; Gubernatorial Task Force for University Campus Safety, 2007: 
North Carolina Department of Justice, 2007;  Oklahoma State Regents for Higher 
Education, 2008; Ohio Board of Regents, 2007). However, the DOE claimed that FERPA 
does provide exceptions for sharing student information without consent. These 
exceptions included school officials with a need to know, other schools that the student 
seeks to enroll, local, state, or federal officials conducting audits of records, records 
pertaining to the funding of financial aid, the victim of an alleged sexual assault, health or 
safety information, parents of dependent students, subpoenas, accrediting bodies, and 
directory information (Family Education Records and Privacy Act, 1974).  The DOE 
asserted that these exceptions allow for institutions to share information.  
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With the voiced confusion by college administrators, the DOE issued clarification 
of the health and safety emergency exception under FERPA (Lipka, 2008). Under this 
guidance document, colleges are allowed to share private student information under the 
health and safety emergency exception. This exception must be properly documented and 
be specific to the particular incident. In these situations, the DOE stated they will not 
second guess institution decisions to disclose under the health/safety exception (Simon, 
2008). Consequently, the parental notification clause of FERPA provided institutions the 
ability to notify parents of alcohol and drug violations of students under the age of 21. 
These provisions of FERPA served as a valuable tool for threat assessment teams in 
managing students of concern. Likewise, the FERPA regulations should be understood by 
all threat assessment team members. Therefore, FERPA regulations and applications 
should be included as threat assessment team training components. 
Implications for the Clery Act. Virginia Tech officials also argued over their 
perceived failure to comply with the Clery Act on the day of the shootings. While 
Virginia Tech did issue a campus notification about the alleged shooter on campus, many 
criticized the institution for delaying the campus notification for two hours (Virginia 
Tech Review Panel, 2007). During the investigation, the DOE found Virginia Tech in 
violation of two compliance issues in relation to the Clery Act: First, they failed to give 
the campus a timely warning notification of the emergency events transpiring on the 
morning of April 16, 2007 and second, they failed to follow their own written policy 
pertaining to notifying students of campus emergencies (Gifford, 2010). In direct 
response to the Virginia Tech shootings, Congress amended the Clery Act in 2008 with 
the following provisions added to regulations: colleges and universities are required to 
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include emergency evacuation procedures with their annual security report and include an 
immediate notification statement to faculty, staff, and students if a significant threat 
exists, expansion of the hate crimes statistic criteria, and development of whistleblower 
protections (Clery Act, 2008). Institutions are required to submit emergency evacuation 
plans, including emergency notification procedures, in conjunction with the annual 
security report previously discussed.  
Implications for Mental Health and Funding. College task forces across the 
country identified mental health and funding as critical components to addressing campus 
violence on campus, as well as addressing students in distress (Governor McDonnell's 
Taskforce for School and Campus Safety, 2008; Gubernatorial Task Force for University 
Campus Safety, 2007; North Carolina Department of Justice, 2007; Oklahoma State 
Regents for Higher Education, 2008; Ohio Board of Regents, 2007). For example, the 
Oklahoma CLASS task force reported only 77 percent of all college campuses employ 
full-time mental health counselors on campus (Oklahoma State Regents for Higher 
Education, 2008). Moreover, the Florida task force emphasized that mental health 
disorders alone do not serve as an indicator of campus violence. However, the task force 
also stressed if mental health disorders are left undiagnosed with no treatment regimen in 
place, risks increased from a threat perspective (Gubernatorial Task Force for University 
Campus Safety, 2007). Theses task forces made various recommendations regarding 
campus safety. Common themes that emerged within these recommendations included 
increasing emergency notification systems, hiring mental health professionals, increasing 
communications with law enforcement, removing communication silos on campus, and 
implementing threat assessment teams. 
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 The lack of funding appeared to be the primary reason task force 
recommendations failed to be implemented. While many colleges and universities spent 
funds to incorporate emergency notification systems that text and phone students, paying 
for these systems during a period of declining budgets remained a challenge (Kanable, 
2008). However, funding more expensive recommendations such as incorporating an 
armed campus police force or establishing mental health counseling centers or increasing 
staff continued to be passed over or delayed due to a lack of funding (Cornell, 2010; 
Randazzo & Cameron, 2011).  
The implementation of threat assessment teams on campus, that increased 
communication efforts in alerting appropriate staff about persons of concern, appeared to 
be on the increase. The National Behavioral Intervention Team Association’s (NaBITA) 
2014 study of 500 higher education institutions found that 94 percent of all respondents 
reported a threat assessment team on campus (Van Brunt, Sokolow, Lewis, Schuster, & 
Golston, 2014).  The importance of campus counseling services cannot be ignored as 
students admitted to the institution with mental health issues continued to increase, along 
with the need for counseling services (Gallagher, 2013).  
Perception of Safety on College Campuses 
Current events that involve violence on college and university campuses led to 
increased levels of fear for safety by the general public. As previously stated, the 
amplified media scrutiny of violent events increased the outcry for stronger safety 
measures even as national crime statistics show decreased levels of violence (U.S. 
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Department of Education, 2007). Likewise, Vermillion (2006) stated that the general 
public lacked awareness of national crime rates and believed these rates are on the rise.  
 Hollis (2010) provided data concerning student perceptions of safety in a Texas 
State University study. Students reported strong feelings of safety related to the images 
and messages the college portrays and distributes about itself, along with media reports 
about the institution. These perceptions outweighed a student’s personal experience with 
violence. Additionally, a series of studies exploring the impact of the Clery Act on  
community stakeholders’ perceptions concerning campus safety found that although 
institutions provided campus crime statistics many are unaware of these numbers, nor do 
they play a role in college selection (Janosik, 2001; Janosik & Gehring, 2001). Janosik 
found that 72 percent of participants from three colleges were unaware of the campus 
crime statistics. Janosik’s follow up study reported similar results with 92 percent of 
participants stating crime statistics did not influence the decision to attend or not attend a 
campus (Janosik & Gehring, 2001).  
Janosik followed up these studies and surveyed over 900 campus law enforcement 
officers about the requirements of the Clery Act. Participants believed that campus safety 
programs improved, with 53 percent stating that the programs were responsible for 
increased confidence by students in campus police and safety measures (2002). 
Additionally, Baker and Boland (2011) studied students, faculty and staff perceptions of 
campus safety at a women’s college. The authors study included 158 faculty/staff 
participants and 460 student participants. Baker and Boland’s study supported the Janosik 
studies as participants also believed the campus to be a safe place. Additionally, 
Woolfolk (2013) also studied faculty and staff perceptions of safety on campus. 
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Woolfolk’s study found that faculty and staff expressed that the institution provided a 
safe environment for the campus community. 
Brown and Morley (2007) conducted a risk perception study involving attitudes 
concerning risk estimation of students and alcohol use. This study included 100 
participants who successfully completed questionnaires at a British institution. Brown 
and Morley found that “people understate personal risk perceptions and believe their 
personal susceptibility to negative events is lesser than the average person” (p. 575).   
University Counseling 
 University counseling services play a pivotal role in prevention strategies for 
campus safety. High profile, violent events that occur on campus heightens sensitivity to 
those in mental health crisis. However, many student issues can threaten the safety of the 
campus community. Therefore, colleges and universities throughout the nation continue 
to hear the cry to do more for students in need of counseling assistance when faced with a 
mental health crisis, drug and alcohol abuse, victims of sexual violence, or other concerns 
that may disrupt the educational environment. Additionally, there is a continuing call to 
fully staff campus counseling centers with qualified mental health professionals to 
address the growing mental health needs of students (Benton, Robertso, Tseng, Newton, 
& Benton, 2003; Kitzrow, 2003; Watkins, Hunt, & Eisenberg, 2012; Wood, 2012).  The 
International Association of Counseling Services (IACS) recommends “a staffing range 
of one full-time employee (FTE) professional staff member to every 1000-1500 students” 
(International Association of Counseling Services, 2010, para. 2). Consequently, the 2014 
National Survey of Counseling Center Directors (NSCCD) reports the counselor to 
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student ratio average at 1 to 2081, well above the recommended ranges (Gallagher, 
2014). Moreover, in the same survey, counseling center directors report more students 
access counseling services with more severe mental health disorders (Gallagher, 2014). 
Changing Trends 
 For over the last thirty years, college and university counseling center directors 
continue to participate in a national survey conducted by American College and 
University Counseling Center Directors (ACUCCD) and the International Association of 
Counseling Services (IASC) to examine the current issues of counseling centers across 
the country. This survey addresses budget, staffing, programmatic trends, clinical 
counseling techniques, and ethics (Gallagher, 2012, 2013, 2014). Financing counseling 
centers continues to be an expensive initiative as staffing practices employ individuals 
with terminal degrees to treat students in need. Trends in counseling services began 
changing in the early 1980s. As counseling services progressed over time, career 
counseling services declined as other mental health counseling issues became more 
prominent (Gallagher, 2012).  
In the 1980s, the counseling trend began to fluctuate away from career 
counseling, shifting towards emotional and personal counseling. Counselors reported 
spending 52 percent of their time counseling students on an emotional level. In 2000, this 
percentage increased to 81 percent and to 88.5 percent in 2006 (Gallagher, 2012; 
Magoon, 1980). In 2014, the NSCCD counselors stated that personal counseling absorbed 
76 percent of counseling appointments with only 7 percent and 5 percent of their time 
spent on academic and career counseling respectively.  As counseling centers emphasized 
37 
 
counseling students in crisis, more students accessed counseling for long-term counseling 
needs resulting in less open appointment times for the student population.  
Various counseling center studies reported counseling center staff believed 
students enter campus with increased stressors and more severe mental health disorders in 
comparison to previous generations (Benton, Robertso, Tseng, Newton, & Benton, 2003; 
Gallagher, 2009; Kandison & DiGeronimo, 2004; Kitzrow, 2003; O’Malley et al., 1990; 
Watkins, Hunt, & Eisenberg, 2012). Gallagher (2009, 2013, 2014) found that 93 percent 
of counseling center directors’ voiced concern with the increased numbers of students 
entering campus counseling centers with serious mental disorders at initial intake. 
Moreover, students entered campus using prescribed psychotropic drugs by treating 
physicians to offset symptoms of mental health disorders (Gallagher, 2013). Personal 
interviews of counseling staff echoed the percentages above, detailing the concern over 
severity of student disorders, as well as the higher frequency use of psychotropic 
medications (Watkins, Hunt, & Eisenburg, 2012). Furthermore, the 2014 NSCCD 
reported the ratio of students to mental health counselors on campus is 2,081 students to 
every counselor (Gallagher, 2014).  The combination of more students with severe 
psychological problems that need long-term counseling taxed the current system resulting 
in longer wait times and fewer available appointments for those institutions that provide 
psychological services (Gallagher, 2014). During this same period, budgets for colleges 
and universities declined leading to fewer opportunities to hire the necessary staff to meet 
the suggested recommendations promoted by IACS.  
Campus counseling staff studied trends of reported student problems at the 
cessation of counseling sessions. Over a course of thirteen years, examination of archived 
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data of student clients identified increases in nineteen areas (relationship, stress/anxiety, 
family issues, situational, educational, depression, developmental, abuse, medication 
used, academic skills, physical problems, substance abuse, eating disorders, personality 
disorders, suicidal, grief, chronic mental disorders, legal, and sexual assault) (Benton, 
Robertson, Tseng, Newton & Benton, 2003). Benton et al. (2003) found that counseling 
staff stated an increase in the reported level of distress in fourteen of the nineteen areas; 
these students entered into the university counseling system with multifaceted 
complications. Some of these complications, as expected, included more concerning and 
complex mental health issues. The more severe problems, such as thoughts of suicide, 
depression, personality disorders, and sexual assault, reported significant increases 
(Benton, Robertson, Tseng, Newton & Benton, 2003). Over thirteen years, students 
presenting with symptoms of depression doubled, suicidal ideation tripled, and those who 
were victims of sexual assault quadrupled (Benton, Robertson, Tseng, Newton & Benton, 
2003). These trends required an increased number of visits for treating at an appropriate 
level as these issues are complex and multi-layered. 
Two-Year Colleges and Counseling 
 Two-year colleges struggle to offer students counseling or psychological services. 
In 2015, the Wisconsin Hope Lab, in conjunction with the American Association of 
Community Colleges, conducted a study of 4000 students at two-year community 
colleges in six states. The authors state that mental health is a larger concern for two-year 
colleges as students entered with a variety of life stressors and broader health issues than 
students at four-year institutions (Eisenberg, Goldrick-Rab, Lipson & Broton, 2016). 
Eisenberg et al. (2106) stated students at two-year colleges experience increased family 
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pressures, financial struggles, and work/school requirements. Additionally, students 
lacked access to appropriate resources to help their situation. This study reported less 
than ten percent of two-year colleges provided psychiatric services (Eisenberg et al., 
2016). If counseling was provided, the counselor to student ratios was reported at 1 to 
3,000, well outside the recommended ratios of 1 to 1,600 (Eisenberg et al., 2016). 
 Epstein (2015) concurred that counseling or psychological services were deficient 
at the two-year college. Epstein stated that this could occur because “there is no mandate 
for community colleges to provide therapy” (p. 291). Additionally, the author agreed that  
those institutions who do provide psychological services suffered significant gaps in 
staffing, especially if those counselors held additional job responsibilities like disability 
accommodations or academic counseling (Epstein, 2016). Furthermore, Daniel and 
Davidson (2014) stated that students at two-year colleges reported “higher diagnosed 
conditions in mental health such as bipolar, schizophrenia, depression and anxiety” (p. 
292). Students at these institutions also reported “significantly higher incidence of 
emotionally and physically abusive relationships, higher levels of suicidal ideation, and 
rates of suicide” than their four-year counterparts (p.292). Epstein (2016) and Daniel and 
Davidson (2014) concluded that coupled with reduced levels of funding and stretched or 
non-existent psychological or counseling resources led to major challenges for the two-
year institution. 
 Finally, the counseling or psychological services in the rural communities lags 
behind services provided in the urban and suburban settings. The Oklahoma State Mental 
Health Department reported that data show "the poorest counties generally have the 
highest rates of drug abuse and mental illness, they also happen to be rural areas … 
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Additionally, fewer than 20% of all psychiatrists in state live and practice outside 
metropolitan areas" (Adcock, 2016, para. 6-7). The metropolitan areas benefit from a 
high number of private and community services than in rural areas. Specified data can be 
found the participant and site section of Chapter III. 
 Counseling is a vital component to the threat assessment team process per best 
practice. Understanding the role of counseling within higher education and specifically, 
the two-year college is instrumental in addressing the challenges of the two-year student. 
Additionally, recognizing the differences and added stressors of students who attend the 
two-year institution experience frames the problems of the student population with 
inadequate resources to address their emotional and mental health. This becomes even 
more critical as the institution identifies students as possible threats. 
Threat Assessment Teams 
 Threat Assessment Teams’ (TAT) origins launched from the US Secret Service 
and the FBI. Government entities utilized the TAT model for decades before the general 
public began to also see the value (Randazzo & Cameron, 2011). Originally utilized by 
the Secret Service to protect and evaluate threats against the President, TAT’s expanded 
to law enforcement after the Secret Service published implementation procedures in 
1990. Because of the popularity of these teams with law enforcement, the Secret Service 
created the National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) in 1998 (Randazzo & Cameron, 
2011). Since this time, agencies such as the US Postal Service, K-12 schools, and now 
higher education began to incorporate TAT’s into worksite safety plans (Randazzo & 
Cameron, 2011). After the shooting incidents witnessed at Virginia Tech and Northern 
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Illinois University, threat assessment teams became a popular preventative strategy to 
address threats to campus safety (Cornell, 2010; Desienger, Randazzo, O’Neill & Savage, 
2008; Leavitt, Spellings, & Gonzalez, 2007; National Association of Attorneys General, 
2007;  Randazzo & Cameron, 2011; Thrower, Healy, & Margolis et al., 2008). The 
National Behavior Intervention Team Association estimated that after Virginia Tech’s 
tragedy over 1600 universities implemented threat assessment teams (Marklein, 2011). 
The 2014 NaBITA survey stated that 94 percent of self-reporting institutions included 
threat assessment teams on campus within prevention efforts (Van Brunt et al., 2014). 
 Threat assessment teams function as a multi-disciplinary approach, representing a 
cross-section of departments on campus to identify and manage persons of concern to 
prevent possible violent incidents. The purpose of these teams is to provide a process to 
support the campus community in identifying the person or behavior of concern, 
investigating the incident or situation, evaluating the seriousness of the concern, and 
managing the threat or plan in place (Randazzo & Cameron, 2011; Deisinger et al., 2008; 
Randazzo & Plummer, 2009).  This process does not replace established policies and 
procedures such as Human Resources or the code of student conduct. Therefore, team 
members refer cases to proper entities and processes as appropriate. 
 The increased level of stress that students experience continues to evolve as 
stressors include more than just academics (Heilbrun, Dvoskin, & Heilbrun, 2009). 
Deisinger, Randazzo, ONeill, & Savage (2008) state it is likely that students in distress 
will exhibit behaviors that alarm multiple areas across campus. If the campus community 
does not communicate these concerns outside their silos, the institution will possess an 
inaccurate assessment of a possibly threatening situation.  One of the largest criticisms of 
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Virginia Tech’s decision-making points to the lack of communication in the management 
of Cho (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007). Therefore, best practices recommend that 
threat assessment teams incorporate a variety of individuals who communicate across 
various disciplines on campus (Deisinger, Randazzo, O”Neill, & Savage, 2008).  These 
best practices for threat assessment teams allow colleges and universities a more 
standardized approach for incorporating this preventative strategy into campus risk 
management initiatives. 
Best Practices for Threat Assessment Teams 
 Colleges utilize threat assessment teams as an integral tool in campus safety and 
security. In order for these groups to operate effectively, teams need critical members in 
place and properly trained. Best practices identify the following positions as ideal to 
serve on the threat assessment team: campus police, student conduct officers, mental 
health counselors, student affairs staff, legal counsel, residential life staff, and human 
resources officials (Deisinger, Randazzo, & O’Neill, 2008; Keller, Hughes, & Hertz, 
2011). Mental health counselors, crucial to the inner workings and success of the threat 
assessment team, bring knowledge of disabilities, FERPA, standard treatment protocols 
and procedures, and mental health referral agencies. Counselors may provide a better 
understanding of the student population enrolled on campus. The student interactions 
through the counseling center provide opportunities to build engagement, outreach, and 
intervention strategies for students of concern and may benefit the threat assessment team 
with case management (Gallagher, 2010; US Dept of Health & Human Services, 2001). 
Likewise, recommendations for the campus police chief or other security personnel 
appointed to the threat assessment team allows for law enforcement and first responder 
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expertise (Keller, Hughes, & Hertz, 2011).  Student conduct officers and Human 
Resources representatives bring knowledge of institutional policy and prior history of any 
conduct related issues to the team. Legal counsel provides the team with relevant case 
law or expertise of current laws such as the American with Disabilities Act, Title IX or 
Title VII.  
Threat assessment is not synonymous with profiling. Understanding the difference 
between these concepts is key for threat assessment teams to operate effectively (Cornell, 
2010; Deisinger et al., 2003). Profiling attempts to predict violence by comparing an 
individual to characteristics or composite of previous attackers (Randazzo & Cameron, 
2012) and remains as a controversial notion in the threat assessment arena. The FBI 
warns, specifically for campus shooters, that there are no consistent characteristics for 
profiling a campus shooter (Deisinger et al., 2008; Vossekuil et al., 2002).  Conversely, 
threat assessment is a behavior-based, deductive process comprised of a) learning of a 
person posing a threat; b) gathering information about the person from multiple sources; 
c) evaluating if that person poses a threat of violence towards others; and d) developing 
and implementing an individualized plan to reduce the threat (Deisinger, et al., 2008). 
Threat assessment teams work from reported behaviors in the forms of communicated 
threats or behaviors that raise a concern by the campus community (Cornell, 2010). The 
process operates from a data-driven report based on stated accounts and research gathered 
about the student.  
As previously stated, the process of identifying the concern, collecting data, 
analyzing the scenario, and evaluating the plan of action by threat assessment teams are 
important key practices (Deisinger et al., 2003; Keller, Hughes & Hertz, 2011). Keller, 
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Hughes, and Herts (2011) highlight the importance of properly educating the team on 
issues that are relevant to the nature of their work. Additionally, best practice identifies 
proper training for the threat assessment team as critical. NaBita recommends team 
members be well-versed in a variety of relevant topics. These trainings include topics 
such as acts of violence, FERPA, the American Disabilities Act, Clery Act, Title IX, 
issues of gender violence in the LGBT community, suicidal ideation, drug and alcohol 
abuse, mental health, diversity, reducing liability, and table-top exercises to increase skill 
level of the team members. A strong understanding of the Family Education Rights 
Privacy Act (FERPA) benefits team members. Equally, the team should also be aware of 
the requirements of the Clery Act, institutional policy, and the student code of conduct.   
NaBita offers training to address how to function as a threat assessment team such as 
communication skills, interviewing techniques, risk assessment tools, proper 
documentation, and promoting the team. Furthermore, the practice of interviewing and 
investigating methods prepares team members for effective data collection (Keller, 
Hughes, & Herts, 2011). Finally, TAT’s should utilize a developed electronic filing 
documentation system to serve as a secure, centralized location to store confidential data.  
Developing and completing a yearly training schedule gives teams the opportunities to 
learn relevant information regarding institutional policy, federal and state law, and legal 
case law to aid the team in proper threat assessment decision-making. Furthermore, 
recommendations to market and promote the threat assessment team, as well as the 
process, encourage campus safety and utilization of established reporting procedures 
(Cornell, 2010). As there are few research studies or models available for threat 
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assessment, these best practices strongly encourage formation of campus threat 
assessment teams regardless of institution type. 
 If threat assessment teams possess knowledge of a dangerous safety situation with 
the ability to intervene, liability could be assessed (Hoffman, 2013). The FERPA health 
and safety emergency exception allows a threat assessment team the ability to intervene 
without penalty of violating student privacy. FERPA also permits internal sharing of 
student information as long as there is a “need to know that is a substantial and 
articulable emergency” (FERPA, 34 CFR § 99.36 (a)(10).  Legal counsel assists in 
determining appropriate legal ramifications of team decisions. 
 American Disabilities Act.  Another consideration for legal implications with 
threat assessment includes students with disabilities. The American Disabilities Act 
(ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 states,   
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall 
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .(p. 1). 
 Federal law states that it is illegal for an institution to discriminate against a student 
based on disability. The ADA covers mental health disorders under this umbrella of law. 
Therefore, college students cannot deny admission because of a disability, nor can they 
be removed from an institution based on disability (McBain, 2008). However, this does 
not absolve a student from abiding by the student code of conduct. Dunkle, Silverstein, 
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and Warner (208) state that threat assessment teams will be confronted with difficult 
situations that include disability law. These situation include, 
violations of student conduct codes by students with mental health disabilities, 
violence or violence committed by students with mental health disabilities, 
assessment of students whose behavior presents a significant risk of harm to 
health or safety of the student to others and mandatory assessment, involuntary 
withdrawal and conditioned readmission of students with mental impairments (p. 
607). 
However, the Office of Civil Rights indicates that it will not question disciplinary action 
if the institution is basing decisions on violations of the Code of Student Conduct, not the 
mental health disability (Jackson, 2003). In May, 2011, the Department of Justice 
publicized updated revisions to Title II of the ADA (Section 35.139) addressing direct 
threats.  These revisions stated institutions are no longer allowed to dismiss or remove a 
student from campus based on an individual being a danger to themselves. The threshold 
for removing a student as a danger must meet the “significant risk to the health or safety 
of others” requirement (American with Disabilities Act Title II Regulations, 2010, p. 
35.139). Western Michigan was investigated in 2013 after an honors student filed a 
complaint with the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) for being involuntarily withdrawn from 
the institution after making suicidal threats. The OCR ruled that the institution could not 
dismiss a student because he or she threatens to harm themselves (Gignac, 2013).  To 
better negotiate difficult issues, it is important for team members to have a strong 
understanding concerning the ADA, specifically Title II, and what threat assessment 
interventions are allowed.    
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 The true challenge for institutions remains to balance the rights and civil liberties 
of an individual with the safety of the campus community (Hoffman, 2013). Legal 
counsel can help by providing case law and legal implications concerning TAT decisions. 
Courts will expect the university to proceed with caution concerning the legal 
implications.   
Summary 
 Campus violence continued to command the attention of not only the campus 
community, but media and society.  This literature review included violence and the 
different issues that can be threats on campus. Additionally, the roles of violence and 
threats in relation to public policy were provided, specifically policies related to higher 
education. Because mental health continued to be a topic of discussion as these traumatic 
events happen in communities across the nation, this literature review included trends in 
mental health counseling on college campuses and provided specific information about 
counseling at two-year colleges. Finally, the literature on threat assessment included 
documentation of best practices and reasons why this philosophy is different from 
profiling. Because there is a gap in the literature regarding threat assessment on the two-
year college, more research is needed to further explore campus officials’ and team 
members’ understanding of threat assessment as a prevention mechanism to deter campus 
violence.  
 The next chapter discusses the methodology used in this study. The methodology 
includes the theoretical framework, study parameters, and participant demographics. 







The overall research plan for the study is included in Chapter III.  Explanations 
for all components of the methodology design, data collection, and data analysis 
procedures utilized in the study are explained. Specifically, this chapter addressed the 
constructivist epistemology and qualitative methodology that served to advise how I 
perceived knowledge. Likewise, the reasoning for the selection of the case study design is 
explained. An overview of the research study, participants, interviews, documents and 
artifacts collected for data analysis is described. Finally, the specific ways that data were 
analyzed are discussed in this chapter. This study focused on the human interaction, 
meanings, and the understandings that participants assigned to the realities on the topic 
studied. Therefore, the qualitative methodology was the appropriate research design. 
General Perspective 
The purpose of this study was to explore the perceptions of the threat assessment 
team’s impact on campus safety, as well as perceptions of barriers or challenges for the 
campus threat assessment teams. This study assumed a constructivist epistemology by 
adhering to the position that knowledge was constructed by an individual. 
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Crotty (1998) described this worldview as,  
A view that all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is 
contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interactions 
between human beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an 
essential social context (p.42). 
The constructivist viewpoint considers meaning or reality as constructed, or 
interpreted, by individuals in the world, providing the foundational basis of this study. 
Therefore, this paradigm encourages meaning making by exploring reality on multiple 
fronts, not focusing on one individual or answer (Creswell, 2009).  Patton (2002) stresses 
that qualitative research collects an individual’s perceived facts pertaining to a 
phenomenon by “capturing what actually takes place and what people actually say” (p. 
28). Because the qualitative methodology best matches the constructivist epistemology, 
this study utilizes appropriate strategies within the qualitative study design. 
 Qualitative inquiry allows for emerging categories and themes in the data 
collection and analysis process to be identified. This methodology also provides for 
various study designs appropriate to this research inquiry. Yin (2009), states that case 
study design is appropriate when “research questions ask how or why, the researcher has 
little to no influence over the phenomenon, or the focus is on a current issue” (p. 2). The 
topic of campus violence and the use of threat assessment teams as a safety strategy meet 
the current issue criteria that Yin describes.  
Moreover, this study incorporated how or why research questions and the 
participant responses were the motivation for the collected data. The research design 
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employed qualitative methods by using a multiple case study of threat assessment teams 
at two-year colleges to further explore member understandings, meanings, and roles 
concerning threat assessment teams in relation to campus safety, challenges and barriers 
for the team. The two-year colleges included in the study operate as open admission 
entities, allowing for a wide-berth of diverse students within the student body.  
As discussed earlier, these students enter the institution with various challenges 
with limited support systems and this may increase their need for support services. 
Consequently, two-year college budgets may not afford the same employment and 
training opportunities for student support activities such as mental health counseling. 
Therefore, emphasizing the viewpoints of the two-year college may be beneficial. This 
multiple case study applies a phenomenological approach to further discern the 
perceptions of culture, norms, and values of the institution and how these integrate into 
resource allocation decisions for threat assessment teams.  
 Yin (2009) recognized different types of case study research including single or 
multiple case designs. Yin provided rationale for selecting the appropriate case study 
design for the research inquiry. Specifically, this study integrated the multiple case study 
design. Multiple case studies are warranted as “the evidence from a multiple cases is 
often considered more compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as more 
robust … Likewise, this model allows for possible replication of the data. ” (Yin, R., 
2009, p. 46-47).  This research design provided the ability to incorporate holistic 
approaches to collecting data such as utilizing interviews, surveys, and artifact collection 
during the research process. Recently, Chinn (2013) and Childress (2014) both 
incorporated the case study design into their respective dissertations on threat assessment. 
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Chinn studied the perceptions of student affairs and academic affairs with collaborative 
efforts of threat assessment team. Childress chose to study how student affairs 
professionals perceive students with mental health needs and how they promote threat 
assessment to the campus community (Childress, 2014). Both of the authors of these 
studies incorporated the case study design to either study a complex phenomenon or to 
include multiple meanings from diverse perspectives. The case study design was an 
appropriate choice for this research design as threat assessment remained a current issue 
with various perspectives from stakeholders and the research questions asked how or 
why. For these reasons, the multiple case study was an appropriate choice for this 
inquiry. 
Research Context 
 To satisfy the multiple case study approach, two different two-year colleges in a 
Midwestern state in the United States were selected for inclusion in this study. These 
institutions were two of the ten two-year colleges that are represented in the state’s higher 
education system. These two-year institutions varied in student population from 3,000 to 
17,000 students, residential/non-residential campuses, and presence/absence of on-
campus counseling services. The institutions selected contained both residents and 
commuter student body populations and accepted federal aid dollars; therefore they 
submitted the annual Safety and Security Report as required by the Clery Act to the 
Department of Education by October 1
st
 each year. Additionally, the Clery Act required 
each institution to also submit emergency management plans with the annual report. Both 
of these documents were assessed to determine if any violent activity occurred on these 
campuses, as well as to ascertain if a threat assessment team was included in the 
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emergency plans submitted to the Department of Education. This study was initiated 
during the fall semester of the 2015 academic year.   
Research participants 
 Participants for this study included higher education administrators and threat 
assessment team members from the two institutions selected for inclusion. Two 
administrators and four team members were recruited to participate to provide data from 
both administration and staff perspectives for the study. These figures allowed for a total 
of six participants. An administrator was defined as the campus president, provost, vice 
president of student affairs, vice president of academic affairs, and vice president of 
finance or an equivalent administrative officer that oversaw threat assessment teams on 
campus. A team member was defined as a non-administrator who served on the threat 
assessment team as assigned. Team members included campus counselors, student 
conduct officers, campus security, human resources professionals, vice president of 
student services and academic affairs, and dean of students or other team members 
assigned to the threat assessment team.  
Sampling strategy 
 Because qualitative research primarily focuses on depth of the data, smaller 
sample sizes were expected (Patton, 2002). Purposeful sampling methods aided in 
choosing information-rich cases to best address the rationale for the study. Specific 
numbers for participation purposes were not required for this sampling method as 
qualitative research is not primarily utilized for generalizability to the population (Patton, 
2002). Emerging data were discovered by focusing the sample on a low number of 
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institutions, paying careful attention to detail of processes, applied meanings, and cultural 
nuances. This sampling strategy allowed for a direct and focused group of participants, 
while still granting the flexibility for exploration of personal perceptions these subjects 
assign to threat assessment. 
Research Sites and Participants 
 A general description about each institution and each of the participants is 
included in this section. Additionally, demographic information about the student 
population is provided. To protect identity, I masked the names of institutions and 
individual participants. 
Brownsville State College. Brownsville State College (BSC), established in the 
1970s to serve the northeastern and southeastern metro area in the state, exists as an 
open-admission institution to provide lower division courses. BSC receives accreditation 
from the Higher Learning Commission to grant associate degrees in over sixty degree 
programs in arts, science, or applied science. Admission requirements, defined in the 
course catalog, reference an open admission policy of “graduation from an accredited 
high school or any non-graduate whose high school class has graduated” (Brownsville 
State College Course Catalog, 2015, p.5). Currently, enrollment exceeds approximately 
13,000 students each year, with a 39 percent full time enrollment and 61 percent part-
time enrollment (National Center of Education Statistics, 2016).  According to BSC’s 
website, the average age of the student population is 27 (Fast Facts, Brownsville State 
College, 2016). The campus consists of twenty-five buildings across 120 acres. 
Currently, BSC offers student housing for 180 residents.   
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Table 3.1 provides information regarding the student population and general 
information about the institution. 












Faculty to student ratio 
Two-year, public 
         Urban 
         39% 
         61% 
         40% 
         60% 
         57% 
         16% 
           5% 
           5% 
           2% 
       19 to 1 
National Center for Education Statistics, 2016 
 The Student Center houses all offices for the interviewees and serves as the hub 
for student services including recruitment, admissions, enrollment, student services, dean 
of students, career services, veterans services, and student support services. Marketing 
displays on the first floor for students and visitors to the campus include the fall schedule, 
course catalog, student newspaper, and brochures to student academic services such as 
tutoring, disability services, and counseling. The first floor of the Student Center houses 
many of the student support services such as the Veteran’s Student Services Office, 
Student Academic Support Services, and the Office of Student Disabilities.  
Participants. Three members of BSC were interviewed as participants for the 
study. Interviews were conducted on a fall Friday afternoon in September, 2015 and 
lasted between forty-five minutes to an hour with each interviewee. These individuals 
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served as campus staff and administrators at the institution. All participants received the 
approved IRB recruitment email and I scheduled interview appointments. Interviews took 
place in the individual offices of the subjects. Subjects received consent forms explaining 
the study, participants’ rights, and contact information of the researcher. This consent 
form also included the confidentiality statement, as well as the request for each interview 
to be audio recorded with the understanding that these recordings would be destroyed 
once transcription occurred. 
 Mike Smith. Mike Smith served as the Dean of Students on campus, as well as the 
chair for Brownsville State College’s Threat Assessment and Behavior Intervention Team 
(TABIT). He was employed at the institution for three years, previously serving as the 
Student Conduct Officer. Mr. Smith promoted to the Dean of Students the previous 
summer when the campus decided to offer student housing beginning in the fall 2015 
semester. The Dean of Students, a new position on campus, reported to Vice President of 
Student Affairs and Marketing.  His responsibilities included the student conduct 
adjudication, as well as supervision within the student services and outreach office and 
residential life. Mr. Smith lived in the residence hall for the current academic year while 
the campus transitioned in the inaugural year of providing housing for students. This 
afforded a 24/7 presence by the Dean of Students at BSC. 
 Mike Smith’s office was located on the second floor of the Student Center 
building, in the center of campus. His office housed one secretary and one student 
worker. He shared his office suite with the Vice President of Student Affairs during the 
Vice President’s office suite remodel. The office provided a space to meet with students 
or other campus community members. The back wall behind his desk contained windows 
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with a view of the campus quad and the new residence halls that he supervised. His 
credenza reflected awards, pictures of students, and his bachelors, masters, and juris 
doctorate diplomas. His desk contained many stacks of papers and keyboard with 
monitor. A file folder opened on his desk showcased the work demanding his current 
attention. As I entered, Mr. Smith collected the papers and placed them back inside the 
folder. The interview took place over at the meeting area where the square table and two 
chairs were located. Mr. Smith appeared relaxed and open throughout the interview 
process. He seemed eager to share information about his institution and interested in the 
outcome of the study. 
 Susan Mayes. Susan Mayes served as the Director of Student Support and 
Outreach. She also acted as the primary licensed counselor for all students at Brownsville 
State College. Ms. Mayes provided a long history for the institution as she has been 
employed for twenty years at the institution. Her employment history included service in 
a variety of positions across campus. Ms. Mayes current responsibilities encompassed 
counseling, disability services, academic support, and the women’s leadership program 
for BSC. Ms. Mayes functioned as a member of the Threat Assessment and Behavior 
Intervention Team (TABIT) and brought the counseling perspective to the team. 
Ms. Mayes’s office was located on the first floor of the Student Center. This 
afforded students the opportunity to know where to go for support services either 
academic or non-academic.  Her office suite housed a secretary, as well as a student 
worker. The office incorporated soft lighting and warm furniture and color schemes. Ms. 
Mayes used the natural light that exuded through the shaded window treatments in her 
office, along with the soft subtle illumination from a corner lamp to offer an inviting and 
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calming space. Two wingback chairs faced a long couch and coffee table with various 
materials to support students. The tranquil sound of running water falling from a corner 
water feature provided a distraction from the quietness that overtakes the room. The soft 
fragrance of lavender welcomed individuals as the seats were filled for sessions aimed to 
destress. Her office environment provided a welcoming space for students to come and 
visit with her to address their needs. Ms. Mayes’s interview took place in the seating area 
in front of her desk. She settled in one of the wingback chairs and I sat across from her on 
the leather couch. 
Brian Green. Brian Green served as the Coordinator of Safety, Security and Risk 
Management. He stated he was employed in this role for eighteen months and was hired 
for this position at Brownsville State College. Mr. Green supervised the institution 
security officers, the contract security officers, and the safety and risk management 
personnel. Previously, Mr. Green worked in an occupational health and safety position in 
a corporate landscape. Mr. Green stated he possessed no previous experience with threat 
assessment other than his current position. He served as a co-chair to the TABIT. 
Mr. Green’s office was located in the Student Center, but on the opposite side of 
the building from the Dean of Students and the Director of Student Support Services. The 
student worker escorted me to Mr. Green’s office for the interview. She stepped outside a 
side door and across an atrium to enter into the Safety and Security Office suite. Upon 
arriving, Mr. Green was not in his office, however his administrative assistant texted him 
of his next appointment. The interview took place in his office, the third office in a hall of 
offices. Mr. Green’s workspace revealed a small office as there was barely enough room 
for his desk and chairs. No windows were observed in this office space. His desk 
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displayed a cluttered workspace with manuals, notebooks, and reports. Before the 
interview, Mr. Green placed his radio on top of the desk and turned down the volume 
chatter. He explained that while he couldn’t turn it off, however he “would turn down the 
distraction” as the interview took place (Green, M., Personal Interview, 2015). 
Documents, artifacts, and webpage. Several different documents and artifacts 
collected served as data for this study. Specifically, documents or webpages that 
referenced threat assessment, safety and security, or policy concerning these 
aforementioned topics were accessed and reviewed for relevant data. Internal policy 
documents collected from the participants provided additional data for inclusion in the 
study.  
Policy and procedures manual. BSC Policy and Procedures manual provided all 
policies and procedures in an internal document for faculty and staff. This document 
served as the operational document for employees to understand the governance and 
organizational structure, policy and procedures and any resolutions passed by the 
governing Board of Regents.  Likewise, the Policy and Procedures Manual provided 
committee purposes and assignments for the campus.  This document was reviewed 
annually for updates and corrections with distribution at the start of the fiscal year in July. 
Although this was an internal document, it was accessed on the webpage in pdf format. A 
participant provided direction to the relevant policy section during the interview and also 
pointed to the location on BSC’s webpage. This document was found by typing in policy 
and procedures into the search bar on the college site.  
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Student handbook. The student handbook was also accessed through the BSC 
website. Specifically, the student handbook was found by clicking on the current student 
tab and scrolling down mid-page to the student handbook button. This document 
provided students all general information regarding the college, student life and student 
organizations, athletics, the code of student conduct, information about the threat 
assessment and behavior intervention team, safety and security, and enrollment 
information. It served as the official notification of policies and procedures regarding 
students.  
Annual Security Report. The Annual Security Report is filed with the Department 
of Education by October 1 of each year as required by the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of 
Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act or Clery Act. This document 
supplied crime statistics for the last three years over Clery reportable offenses within the 
reportable mileage area for the campus. These Clery reportable offenses included: 
murder, manslaughter, aggravated assault, sex offenses, robbery, burglary, motor vehicle 
theft, arson, hate crimes, and drugs and liquor violations.  The Annual Security Report 
remained available on BSC’s website allowing for access by faculty, staff, students, and 
the community to view crime records and can be downloaded from the safety and 
security portion of the institution’s website. 
NaBita risk assessment tool. The NaBita Risk Assessment, designed by the 
National Behavior Intervention Team Association (NaBita), operated as an assessment 
instrument promoted to aid threat assessment teams by "providing a rubric for behavioral 
and risk evaluation and helps create a common language for behavioral intervention" 
(Sokolow, Lewis, Schuster, Swinton, & Van Brunt, 2014, p.2).  The TABIT team utilized 
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this assessment piece at BSC to assess students of concern in relation to harm to self and 
harm to others. This tool also provided strategies to implement to address behaviors of 
concern and corresponded with a white paper to detail how the tool should be used for 
threat assessment teams.  
The instrument is divided into three columns titled Harm to Self: Mental and 
Behavioral Health, "The D-Scale, Overall and Generalized Risk Rubric, and Harm to 
Self: Nine Levels of Hostility and Violence (NCHERM, 2014). This rubric is included in 
the appendix (See appendix D). Each of these columns served a purpose in determining 
the level of threat. The overall risk (middle column) gave a visual of the risk associated 
with the student of concern. These data were helpful to the discussion of the threat level 
process. 
News8.com. This website supplied local, state and national news stories in an 
online format. A variety of news topics were covered on this media outlet. An article 
documented a shooting occurring on the BSC campus provided information concerning 
the campus response to this shooting. Access to this article was found by searching for 
BSC and campus safety. The article review aided to determine if this event fell under the 
purview of the threat assessment and behavior intervention team. 
Webpage. BSC’s webpage offered valuable information regarding the campus. 
The webpage contained general campus information and history, student admission and 
enrollment information, requirements for financial aid, academic programs, career 
services, student life, student conduct, resident life, community development, and 
faculty/staff information. Multiple pages provided information relevant to this study. 
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About Us. The About Us page of BSC’s website served as the landing spot for 
general college information for the community. The purpose of this section operated for 
recruitment of new students to the institution, but also offered useful information for the 
general public. Several important links housed on this page led to more specific 
information. Specifically, clicking on the Our College tab linked to college history, the 
president’s welcome, human resources, fast facts, statistics, policies and procedures, 
board of regents, academic catalog, and consumer information (About Us, Brownsville 
State College, 2016). These pages provided access to the Policy and Procedures manual 
and the Annual Security Report that held the written policy for the college’s threat 
assessment and behavior intervention team. 
Campus security. The campus security page, also accessed through the About Us 
page by clicking on the Our Campus tab, offered several different links such as important 
campus numbers, residence life, emergency procedures and safety and security. Clicking 
on the safety and security link supplied information on emergency procedures and 
general information about campus safety and security. This included the partnerships 
with the local police department and the campus security authorities contact information.  
Redwood State College. Redwood State College (RSC), established in 1907 as 
one of six agricultural schools, confers two-year associate degrees in a rural eastern area 
of the state. The Higher Learning Commission reports a ten year accreditation for RSC 
beginning in 2010-2011 for ten years (Higher Learning Commission, 2016). RSC offers 
twenty associate degrees and certificates and enrolls a student population of 2700 
annually (National Center of Education Statistics, 2016).  RSC contains two campuses, 
the main campus in Redwood and a satellite campus in nearby Morgantown. The main 
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campus houses nineteen buildings, farm and ranch for agricultural programs, and athletic 
fields. The satellite campus encompasses two academic buildings (About Us, Redwood 
State College).  
 RSC operates as an open admission institution that accepts students who 
graduated from an accredited high school. The campus reports the average age of the 
student population at 25, with the main campus enrolling a higher number of traditional 
age students and the satellite campus registering a higher rate of the non-traditional 
student population (Campus Profile, Redwood State College). RSC provides housing on 
the main campus and has 363 students living on campus (Campus Profile, Redwood State 
College). 
 As a rural institution, access to mental health services is limited in the area. The 
State Mental Health Department reports that the home county where RSC is located as 
one of the ten counties with the “highest rates of reporting mental distress and lowest 
number of providers in the county at twelve psychiatrist and six counselor psychologists” 
(Adcock, 2016, para 7). Additionally, they state the population within the county who 
report mental distress at 15 percent (Adcock, para 6).  
Table 3.2 provides information regarding the student population and general 


















Faculty to student ratio 
Two-year, public 
        Rural 
         62% 
         38% 
         33% 
         67% 
         51% 
           7% 
         33% 
           3% 
         <0% 
       22 to 1 
National Center for Education Statistics, 2016 
Heritage Hall houses the majority of the campus resource offices and functions of 
recruitment, admissions, enrollment, financial aid, student support services, cashier, 
assessment and learning, technology support, human resources, and academic services. 
This building sits in the center of campus separated from the academic buildings by the 
main road of campus. Heritage Hall’s primary purpose functions as a one-stop shop for 
enrollment and academic services for future and current students (Redwood State College 
Catalog, 2015). The first floor layout contains the majority of the aforementioned student 
services offices. The main lobby holds an information desk that displays marketing 
information for enrollment, recruitment, veteran’s services, and academic tutoring. The 
environment is very bright with natural light from the cascading windows serving to aid 
in the fresh, openness of the building. A large staircase leads to the second floor 
administration offices and conference rooms. Scheduled interviews take place in a 
conference room on the second floor to ensure privacy for participants.  
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Participants. Participant interviews for the study consisted of three members of 
RSC. Interviews were conducted on a fall morning in October and lasted between forty-
five minutes to an hour with each interviewee. These individuals served as campus staff 
and administrators at the institution. All participants received the IRB approved 
recruitment email and interview appointments were scheduled by the Student Services 
administrative assistant with all interviews to take place on the same day in a 
predetermined conference room. Consent forms were provided to all subjects explaining 
the study, participant’s rights, and contact information of the researcher. This consent 
form also expressed the confidentiality statement, as well as the request for each 
interview to be audio recorded with the understanding that these recordings would be 
destroyed once transcription occurred. 
Bob Jones. Bob Jones served as the chief officer of security on campus. He was 
employed at the institution for three years, two years as the Chief Officer. Prior to the 
chief position, Mr. Jones acted as a campus officer and his previous work experience 
included twenty years in law enforcement. He was dressed in a law enforcement uniform 
and appeared to be in his late fifties. Mr. Jones’s office was located at the campus police 
station next door to the campus residence halls. However, his interview took place in the 
conference room in Heritage Hall. The conference room design exhibited a longer 
rectangular shape with a large conference table and five or six black leather chairs on 
each side. The back wall included a credenza cabinet behind the conference table with a 
coffee pot and cups located on the counter. A clock hung above the credenza on the wall 
for time keeping, as well as a flat screen monitor on the east wall for presentations. 
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Dr. Quincy Smith. Dr. Smith represented the administration on the threat 
assessment team as the Vice President of Student Services and Academics. Dr. Smith 
worked at RSC for over twenty years in a variety of positions. Originally hired as a 
faculty member, Dr. Smith served as the Director of Distance Education, Dean of Student 
Enrollment, and Vice President of Student Services. He held a unique knowledge of the 
university as he was also an alumna of RSC. Dr. Smith received his associate’s degree in 
agriculture before pursuing further education for his bachelors, masters and Ph.D. 
Dean Manning. Dean Manning was assigned to the threat assessment team at 
RSC representing student services. Mr. Manning served as the Dean of Students and 
supervised residence life, student conduct, athletics, student life, and all leadership 
programs. He worked at RSC for the last two years and his prior employment included 
work for the state’s department of human services as the director of child protective 
services for the local county. The dean of students’ office was located in the Student 
Center along with the campus cafeteria, student lounge, and café.  
Documents and Artifacts. Documents and artifacts were collected as data to be 
analyzed for this study. Specifically, items referencing threat assessment teams, safety 
and security, or campus policy included in these topics warranted collection. These items 
were reviewed for significance to this study. The threat assessment team members 
provided internal policy documents.  
 Policy.  Mr. Jones supplied me with RSC’s threat assessment policy. This 
document defined the purpose of the campus threat assessment team, membership, and 
levels of threat. It also described the process the threat assessment team utilized as they 
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met to discuss student concerns. This policy remained as an internal document and was 
not located on the website or in the student handbook. 
 Annual Security Report. The annual security report was located for download on 
RSC’s Safety and Security website. This report offered a snapshot view of crime statistics 
for the campus over the last three years. The Clery Act required each campus who 
received federal funds in the form of financial aid to submit this report by October 1 each 
year. This report was located by clicking on the administration tab and then campus 
safety and security. Crime statistics on the top black bar opened the page to the annual 
report pdf. 
 Website. The RSC webpage provided a wealth of information about the campus 
and also functioned as a resource tool for students, faculty and staff. The website held 
general information about the campus, admissions, recruitment, enrollment, student 
conduct, student support services, and academics. Several pages were accessed for data 
relevant to the institution. 
 About us. The About Us page supplied a one-stop location for information the 
general public may obtain while doing research about the institution. This tab provided a 
gateway to campus information such as: campus history, student life, strategic plan, 
consumer information, and the campus profile. 
 Redwood: Through the years. This page provided a historical overview of RSC 
from the beginning years to the current era. This synopsis gave original purpose and 
mission of the institution and showed the natural expansion and growth of the college. 
Primarily, campus visitors who are not familiar with campus accessed this information.  
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 Consumer information. The consumer information served as a valuable resource 
for those individuals who acquired data about the campus such as admission 
requirements, financial aid, diversity of the student body, privacy information, safety and 
security, vaccination policies, retention and graduation rates. Consumer information was 
located through the About Us tab on the webpage. Though this data can also be found as 
individual webpages through the RSC site, the consumer information page acted as a 
landing page linking all of these areas from one place. 
 Campus safety and security. The safety and security webpage gave the campus 
community safety information campus. This site encompassed general safety information 
and direction on how to report criminal activity or concerns. The online threat assessment 
reporting form was located underneath the forms section. The form served as the official 
referral for persons of concern, as well as communicated how to report emergencies.  The 
online threat assessment form provided vital information in the reporting process for the 
threat assessment team. 
Data Instruments 
In order to collect data from administrators and team members, I served as the 
primary research instrument by conducting personal interviews. An interview guide was 
used to assure consistency and relevant data were collected, but still granted the 
flexibility to pursue follow up questions of the participants. Institutional artifacts and 
documents, including policy documents, institutional documents, annual security reports, 
websites, newspaper articles or any other appropriate documentation were analyzed for 
triangulation of data sources. Furthermore, field notes were created to document non-
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verbal cues during interviews and record any follow-up questions or relevant thoughts 
following the personal interviews of subjects. These strategies allowed for both verbal 
and non-verbal data to be collected and analyzed. 
 Patton (2002) stressed the importance of understanding and disclosing how the 
researcher’s experience and/or background affects how information is viewed and 
understood. For this study, my experience included membership on an institutional threat 
assessment team at a two-year college as well as participation on a threat assessment 
team with missing membership components due to budgetary constraints on a smaller 
two-year campus. I also attended training for threat assessment in the college setting and 
acquired knowledge of student conduct policies and processes that many times were 
interwoven into threat assessment. 
Data Collection 
 To collect data, an email was sent to the members of the state’s two year colleges. 
This data was obtained from the state’s higher education regent’s office. The email 
served to introduce the study and allowed for general discussion about the topic of threat 
assessment. Specifically, it aimed to recruit two-year institutions with established threat 
assessment teams to participate. The institutions selected to participate were provided 
with a consent form that presented an overview of the study and participant rights, 
including the ability to discontinue participation in the study at any time.  
 Planned interviews with the campus administrator were conducted first to allow 
for explanation of mission, purpose, and authority of the threat assessment team from the 
administrative viewpoint. Interview guides were utilized to ensure all subjects of the team 
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were asked questions consistently. However, allowing flexibility in the interviews was 
critical to permit appropriate follow up on any emerging information provided by the 
subjects. Questions addressed the culture, values and norms of the executive 
administration and the institution as a whole. This inquiry also addressed committee 
development, institutional policy, and resource allocation concerning threat assessment 
(See interview guide, Appendix A). Upon concluding the interview, I asked the 
administrator to send the provided email correspondence to team members explaining the 
study, as well as informing them that they would be contacted to inquire about 
participation. This email was not intended to identify members as these individuals were 
selected for committee assignment, but to lend the site administrator’s credibility and 
awareness of research being conducted on campus to the team members. 
Secondly, team members were interviewed to collect data about team processes 
and to allow for member perceptions and meanings related to these processes to emerge. 
These questions incorporated questions about institutional policy, team leadership, 
communication, training, resource allocation and conflict resolution. Follow-up 
interviews were conducted as appropriate to address any gaps in the data, or to seek 
further clarification or review on statements made by team members. These follow-up 
interviews were conducted in person or by telephone as appropriate.  Once all the 
interview data was collected and transcribed, the data was sent to the participant for 
member checking.  
Finally, to allow for triangulation of data and to provide a more complete picture 
of the institutional landscape, campus documents and artifacts were collected. Analyzing 
multiple data sources aided in addressing validity and trustworthiness of the data 
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collection. These documents included institutional webpages, written policy, newspaper 
or campus newspaper clippings addressing campus violence, the annual safety report 
provided to the U.S. Department of Education and any appropriate committee meeting 
minutes that were available. These records were found by researching current public 
information, requesting internal documents from the institution, and referring to 
submitted reports to the DOE. Incorporating these data pieces into the collection allowed 
for conversational questions during interviews, as well as provided references to 
protocols and policies during data analysis.  
Several techniques used in the data collection process helped to address the 
trustworthiness of the research. Triangulating data sources with interviews and document 
artifact collection aided to verify the data. Member checking the transcripts with research 
participants helped to assure interpretations of the transcripts were correct. Employing 
reflexive journals and peer debriefing in the form of journal memos and formal or 
informal discussion with a peer provided an avenue for emerging themes in the data to be 
analyzed as well as track decisions.  All of these techniques were beneficial to the 
analysis of the data. 
Data Analysis 
 Culture Theory served as a theoretical framework as discussed in Chapter One. 
This theoretical lens looked closely at risk assessment in threat assessment teams. First, 
all interviews were transcribed and shared with the subject for accuracy in the 
transcription. This technique, called member checking, was used to establish 
trustworthiness in qualitative data. Before the theoretical framework was incorporated as 
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a final analysis, all data sources were analyzed to search for the common categories and 
themes that emerged through open coding. Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw (2011) described a 
variety of techniques to aid in analysis for deeper understanding of member meanings 
that was beneficial in analysis. The authors explained these techniques as: 
A number of distinct moments in group life highlight how members express, 
orient to, and create local meaning. Ethnographers begin to construct members’ 
meanings by looking closely at what members say and do during such moments, 
paying particular attention to the words, phrases, and categories that members use 
in their everyday interactions (Emerson et al., 2011, p. 134). 
These strategies allowed for exploration of possible cultural notions and norms that were 
common in the environment by utilizing categories such as member’s meanings, member 
terms, everyday questions and answers, member descriptions, member stories, member 
contexts and contrasts, and member explanation and theories (Emerson et al, 2011). 
 Emerson et al. (2011) stressed that categorizing comments into these criterions 
was not the focus of practicing the exercises, moreover, the importance was considering 
“sensitively representing in written texts what local people consider meaningful and 
important” (p. 130). By paying attention to members’ terms in addressing members, one 
better understood the formality or informality and social relations of the group. Likewise, 
considering how subjects asked everyday questions and how these questions were 
answered provided understanding of the underlying workings of a group. By asking 
open-ended questions, individuals were able to answer in ways that were natural in the 
setting for that group. Another strategy encouraged by Emerson included paying close 
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attention to members’ descriptions of events, activities, or groups (2011). Incorporating 
this technique allowed the subject’s voice to be the focus; therefore assumed 
understanding or predetermined meanings were lessened. Member invoked contexts and 
contrasts allowed subjects to describe the importance of events and explain why these 
events were important in their own words. Considering contrasting events in the same 
manner offered an opportunity to better understand group or personal changes over time 
as perceived by the subject. 
 Critical incidents cited by the participants were also analyzed. A critical incident 
is defined as an activity or event perceived by an individual to enact some change in 
behavior or action (Emerson et al., 2011). These incidents happened in a variety of 
scenarios and provided multiple responses. By exploring the data for critical incidents, it 
allowed for deeper understanding of allocation of resources and strengths and weaknesses 
in the threat assessment team process.  
Cultural Theory sought to understand societal conflict in assigning risk to cultural 
issues. This theory incorporated risk assessment and assignment, group culture and 
conflict. As stated above, this theoretical framework was a foundational analysis 
component to this study. Yin (2011) discussed the importance creating an analysis 
strategy incorporating open coding and allowing the themes and categories to emerge 
from the data before applying any “theoretical prepositions” of the framework (p.111). 
This strategy provided a safeguard from applying an apriori theory. Therefore, all data 
were analyzed as a final strategy to determine the applicability of Cultural Theory. The 
Cultural Theory lens was applied after the initial coding and Emerson’s techniques were 
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completed to determine how or if the emerging categories and themes aligned within the 
framework.  
Summary 
The primary purpose of this chapter was to outline the methodology and methods 
utilized in this study. The constructivist epistemology set the foundation and guided this 
study with the worldview that knowledge encompasses multiple meanings based on 
individual perceptions. Likewise, the multiple case study design afforded the appropriate 
approach to conduct the study.  The sampling methods, participations sites and subjects 
were presented, along with data collection methods. Finally, the data analysis exercises 
used to aid in the discovery of merging categories and themes were given.    
The next chapter will present the findings for this study. The structure of this 
chapter will categorize data by institution, then by the cases together. The findings will 













Chapter III provided details concerning the research methodology design for this 
study. The methodology chapter served as the blueprint moving forward in this research 
initiative and supplied a detailed description of the research sites, participants, and 
documents gathered for inclusion in the findings and analysis. This study design 
represented a multiple case study approach, therefore it was appropriate to explain results 
from not only the individual institutions, but also to incorporate the cross-case findings to 
search for patterns. Yin (2014) stated when a pattern from one case is replicated by data 
from another case, the finding is stronger. This chapter presents the findings from all 
cases to prepare for the discussion in Chapter V. 
 As Chapter III explained, two institutions offering two-year associate degrees 
were selected to be included in this study. Data collection consisted of documents, 
artifacts, and personal interviews of participants at each site. The research questions 
sought to understand the perceptions of the impact of threat assessment teams on campus 
on the two-year campus.  
 The interviews functioned as the primary basis for data collection, along with 
written documents and artifacts. The findings presented below represented the 
participants’ comments throughout the interview process and their perceptions of the 
75 
 
practice of threat assessment on campus safety. This study focused on the perceptions of 
threat assessment team members at two-year colleges, specifically Brownsville State 
College (BSC) and Redwood State College (RSC). The findings presented below include 
each case individually, and the cross-case findings taken together.  
Brownsville State College 
As described in Chapter III, Brownsville State College served an urban area of the 
state as an open-admission, two-year institution. I visited Brownsville State College on 
two adjacent weekday afternoons to conduct three interviews of the threat assessment 
team and behavior intervention team (TABIT) members. The findings presented in this 
section emerged from the interview transcripts and documents gathered for this study. 
This section provided the findings for participants’ perceptions of threat assessment 
teams on campus safety and the challenges faced by TAT’s at two-year colleges. The 
BSC TABIT traditionally managed seven to ten cases per year through the threat 
assessment team process. The types of concerns that the TABIT heard included students 
experiencing mental health issues, veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder, alcohol or 
drug issues, suicidal ideation, and disruptions in the classroom. 
Perceptions of TATs on Campus Safety 
Transparency. Each participant was asked a series of questions during the 
interview process using an interview guide as a question prompt. These questions 
revolved around members’ interpretations or perceptions of threat assessment teams and 
the impact on campus safety. All subjects at BSC voiced the importance of transparency 
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from the inception of the team. A critical component to the transparency included 
providing buy-in from the campus community early in the planning stages:  
When we had the first group of people involved we made it clear to this campus 
that we wanted people to know about threat assessment. That we did not have a 
package we were unfolding, but we were building this as we were moving 
forward. We asked for the campus to be patient as we were in the beginning 
stages. There were people from every academic division involved and we 
encouraged them to go back and speak with people in their areas (Mayes, S., 
personal communication, September 11, 2015). 
Similar views expressed the importance of transparency on the perception of the campus 
threat assessment and behavior intervention team. One member commented “the 
openness from the beginning led to buy-in as members were recruited based off of skills 
or expertise regardless of status” (Green, B., personal communication,  September 11, 
2015). Another member expressed the significance of inclusion of campus employee 
stakeholders not only for involvement, but to lend credibility to the team’s work. He 
summarized the perception of this campus initiative saying,  
This happened so the campus would have ownership in this. It was done out in the 
open for people to see. You know we don’t want this to come off and appear as a 
committee that is sitting around and making decisions on student fate in the dark. 
We operate in the open (Smith, M., personal communication, September 10, 
2015). 
Likewise, another participated stated, 
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Faculty embraced this concept as they viewed it as another way to help students. 
We reached out to all units on campus: administration, academic departments, 
faculty, staff …we provided communication to everyone during the start of this 
team. It helped us to get buy-in from the start of TABIT (Mayes, S., personal 
communication, September 11, 2015.) 
However, while the transparency was commended by the participants, they recognized 
that the initial committee was too large and arduous for timely meetings, “discovering 
fifteen people was too big … we shrunk it down to five to eight people and we strived to 
make sure every area of the college was represented” (Green, B., personal 
communication, September 11, 2015). 
Likewise, the role the administration played in the team transparency element 
remained critical. This transparency was described as the openness of the administration 
to present the concept to important campus stakeholders aided in providing a smooth 
transition to team formation. Administration placed importance for the campus 
community to be informed appropriately about the TABIT and allowed opportunities for 
the campus to ask questions regarding the team’s purpose.  From the early days to the 
present, participants commented that administration offered support “by promoting the 
team at bi-annual faculty in-services” (Green, B., personal communication, September 
11, 2015) or “promoting the team at bi-annual faculty in-service” (Mayes, S. personal 
communication, September 11, 2015) provided examples of how administration 
supported the group. Both older and newer participants found representation in these 
statements reporting that administration not only supports the work the group does, but 
acts to give credibility and legitimacy to campus stakeholders. 
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Campus Safety. Perceptions of the impact of the TABIT on campus safety at 
BSC were positive to the different stakeholders of the institution according to the 
interviewees. The mission of the TABIT team states:  
The mission of the TABIT team is to balance the individual needs of the student 
 and those of the great campus community, provide a structured positive method 
 for addressing student behaviors that impact the campus community and may 
 involve mental health and/or safety issues, manage each case individually, initiate 
 appropriate intervention without immediately resorting to punitive measures, and 
 to eliminate fragmented care (Brownsville State College Threat Assessment 
 Policy, p. 1). 
Comments such as “faculty sees this process as an avenue, a vehicle to get students 
anonymity and confidentiality to a place that they can report concerns and get students 
the help they need instead of trouble in conduct” (Smith, M, personal communication, 
September 11, 2015) or that “faculty viewpoints changed when they realized they won’t 
be laughed at or look like an idiot if they report” (Green, B., personal communication, 
September 11, 2015) provided insight into the excitement for this process by the team. 
Likewise, these statements spoke to their reporting process for the campus community as 
it allowed for both confidential and anonymous reporting of concerns Participants stated 
movement towards collaborative threat assessment happened when the culture of the 
institution began to change with new administration. 
Team members stated this change allowed deans and faculty a place to “voice 
legitimate concerns” (Smith, M., personal communication, September 10, 2015) and “an 
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opportunity to guide and mentor students at risk” (Mayes, S., September 11, 2015). The 
team claimed that faculty saw the benefits of this group the most as this provided a direct 
referral to manage student concerns. Evidence continued to be reported throughout the 
interviews that the TABIT provided a place to report the “what ifs or the I am not sures” 
(Green, B., personal communication, September 11, 2015) to the appropriate institutional 
personnel. Participants stated that this group “connects those who are struggling with 
resources” (Mayes, S., personal communication, September 11, 2015) and “aids in 
creating a campus of safety” (Green, B. personal communication, September 11, 2015) 
was also voiced frequently about the TABIT.  
While participants recognized the positive perceptions of faculty who “are aware” 
(Smith, M., personal communication, September 10, 2015) insight that there “are still 
campus faculty and staff that are not sure of the purpose” (Smith, M., personal 
communication, September 10, 2015) or “concerned that this only leads to trouble for the 
student” (Green, B., personal communication, September 11, 2015) continued to worry 
the team. Likewise, the uneasiness regarding the awareness of the student body remained 
a problem as evidenced by this statement, “we have to do more than just put it in the 
handbook and call it good. Our students don’t read that unless they are looking for a 
specific issue” (Mayes, S., personal communication, September 11, 2015). All members 
questioned how cognizant students are of the process or the importance of the threat 
assessment team to campus safety.  
Annual Security Report. The Annual Security Report for BSC, located on the 
college website, supported findings of the President's statements about campus security 
and TABIT’s role in the safety protocols. Specifically, the President highlighted the 
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different strategies the campus conducts to aid personnel in keeping the community safe 
in the Annual Security Report. She featured the work of the TABIT team saying, “the 
TABIT is on campus to analyze reports of campus members in crisis or exhibiting 
concerning or dangerous behavior” (BSC Annual Security Report, 2014, p.2). Likewise, 
the report itself referenced the importance of the TABIT to campus safety by detailing the 
team under the security awareness and preventative measures section of the document.  
President's Response to Security Event and Faculty Senate Minutes. 
Recently, a shooting on the campus of BSC occurred in the early morning hours before 
classes began. Although this incident did not involve a current student of BSC, the 
subject/victim ran onto campus with local police units in pursuit. Emergency notification 
from the institution provided instructions through the webpage and media outlets about 
safety and security while the incident was in progress. However, the emergency 
notification system utilizing the text and email function was not activated for this 
situation. Following the event, the president released a statement to address the shooting 
to the campus community and the general public. 
The statement explained that a police foot chase resulted when the subject 
attempted to hide his location near a building on campus. The individual opened fire on 
the police officer who returned fire and gained control of the situation. Officers from the 
local police arrived on campus within two minutes and the incident concluded within five 
minutes. Furthermore, the report stressed the importance of student safety and thanked 
the local authorities and the contracted security force for their quick response. 
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According to the monthly faculty senate minutes, the senate discussed this event 
in their monthly meeting. The minutes reflected expressions of concern about whether the 
campus was notified appropriately when the shooting occurred as many were left 
"unaware" and there was a "communication breakdown" by not using the emergency 
notification system (BSC Faculty Senate Minutes, September, 2015). As a result of these 
comments, the voting body recommended information for all safety and security 
processes or programs, including TABIT, be added to the spring convocation for all 
campus constituents to be aware of the safety systems in place.  
Student Handbook. The student handbook served as the primary publication to 
students about campus policies, procedures and resources. This document addressed 
campus safety, although the student handbook did not provide quotes about the 
perception of the campus community concerning TABIT. The TABIT was described as 
"dedicated and qualified staff" that looks "to balance individual needs of the students and 
those of the greater campus community" (RSC Student Handbook, 2015, p. 16). 
Likewise, the handbook portrayed the team as engaging in "appropriate interventions 
instead of punitive measures and fragmented care" (BSC Student Handbook, 2015, P.16). 
The motto, "If you see something, say something" was introduced to the student in this 
publication and encourages reporting of concerning behavior (BSC Student Handbook, 
2015, p. 16). 
Campus Challenges for Threat Assessment Team 
Many Roles. Interview participants at BSC appeared to be enthusiastic members 
of the TABIT team. Each person represented a critical function for the purpose of threat 
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assessment on campus. However, finding emerged concerning challenges the group faced 
as they continued to move forward into a stronger team. One of the most noted challenges 
cited included the many roles committee members played on campus. The “day-to-day 
responsibilities of the job” (Green, B., personal communication, September 11, 2015) and 
the “pulls from different stakeholders” (Smith, M., personal communication, September 
10, 2015) pushed scheduled meetings as a lesser priority if there was not a specific 
student concern to discuss. The chair of the committee recognized that training meetings 
became difficult to maintain at the end of the spring semester resulting in an abbreviated 
training schedule.  
Membership. Many two-year institutions operated with lean departmental 
staffing with individuals responsible for multiple roles on campus. As the titles of the 
interviewees suggested, BSC TABIT members performed critical roles on campus. The 
Dean of Students served as the student conduct officer, Title IX Coordinator, Residence 
Life Director, and TABIT chair. Likewise, the Coordinator of Safety, Security and Risk 
Management job responsibilities encompassed parts of TABIT, but the safety aspect of 
his job was much more than just this process. The occupational safety requirements for 
the institution fell under this position, as well as security staff and contracts. The Director 
of Student Outreach job responsibilities included student counseling, disabilities services, 
women leadership programs, domestic abuse programs, TABIT, and student academic 
support. One participant stated, “Even though priorities change for the administration, the 
removal of former priorities rarely occurs” (Mayes, S., personal communication, 
September 11, 2015).  
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Members at BSC reported the ideal membership on the TABIT team was 
challenging at the community college because the candidates for the membership pool 
was limited. This presented a concern as evidenced by the following statement, “the pool 
is so small on this campus there is no one that I would select in some areas and have 
confidence that information would be kept confidential” (Green, B., personal 
communication, September 10, 2015). Member selection targeted those individuals who 
brought area expertise or represented a critical position in relation to the TABIT purpose. 
Everyone who has been picked on this team is on because of their position, but 
then also their specific background or expertise … it wasn’t just decided by 
throwing names in a hat. We actually looked at the individual and said 'what is 
their background' (Smith, M., personal communication, September 10, 2015)? 
Therefore, participants stated some roles may go unfilled or unrepresented on TABIT 
because of people wearing “many hats” (Smith, M., personal communication, September 
10, 2015) “unqualified departmental personnel” (Green, B., personal communication, 
September 11, 2015) or “not having that position” (Mayes, S., personal communication, 
September 11, 2015) on campus.  
Consistent meetings. One of the identified best practices from NaBita was for 
teams to meet on a pre-determined, consistent basis (Sokolow & Lewis, 2009; Van Brunt, 
Sokolow, Lewis, Schuster, & Golston, 2014). For some colleges, this occurred every 
week, for others bi-monthly or monthly. Participants from BSC stated they met monthly 
for the behavior intervention process and met as needed for the threat assessment 
protocol. For this team, the behavior intervention process incorporated the case 
management function and the threat assessment protocol included the Dean of Students, 
84 
 
Safety and Security Coordinator, and the Mental Health Counselor who was responsible 
for deciding if the entire group needed to be called together or the concern transferred 
over to the police. The group recognized that as the business of the semester transpired, 
meetings were sometimes cancelled or postponed. These actions made it difficult for the 
team to then find another time to meet as a group.  
Confidentiality. All members at BSC referenced the importance of 
confidentiality for those students who were brought forward to the TABIT. For the 
campus counselor, confidentiality remained critical to her “role on campus” (Green, B., 
personal communication, September 11, 2015) and the TABIT cannot “compromise the 
information shared in a counselor-client relationship” (Mayes, S., personal 
communication, September 11, 2015). The team reported they experienced times when 
they “realize this person cannot speak up” and therefore “is very careful not to ask 
questions to put this person in a difficult position” in order to comply with regulations of 
the counseling profession (Green, B., personal communication, September 11, 2015).  
Participants cited this as a challenge because “the campus only has one and a half 
counselor positions available to the entire student body” (Smith, M., personal 
communication, September 10, 2015). 
Awareness of team. The promotion of the TABIT team focused on 
communication to faculty, staff and administration. Participants stated the primary tool 
used to communicate and publicize the TABIT included “faculty in-services” (Green, B., 
Mayes, S., & Smith, M., personal communication, September 10-11, 2015). The main 
objective of these presentations focused on “awareness to notify faculty how to connect” 
to the TABIT (Mayes, S., personal communication, September 11, 2015).  Likewise, the 
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team stated that information “blasted out in an email at the beginning of the semester” 
needed to be revisited later in the semester and throughout the academic year to keep 
faculty from forgetting about the resource (Smith, M., personal communication, 
September 10, 2015).  
The team stated the promoting the message to the students about TABIT’s 
purpose and how to report issues was a concern. The primary mode of promotion to the 
student body about TABIT occurred through the student handbook. Statements such as 
“the need for reoccurring marketing” (Smith, M., personal communication, September 
10, 2015) and the need for “sustained marketing of the team purpose” (Mayes, S., 
personal communication, September 11, 2015) showed that promotion to students lacked 
a comprehensive awareness and education strategy or plan.  
Training and budget. Although training and budget can be viewed as two 
different challenges, these two issues seemed intertwined in the comments of the 
members. Findings of how training transpired for the BSC team appeared mixed, as the 
group determined training needs annually. Interviews revealed that training needs were 
identified at the beginning of the academic year and topics were mutually agreed upon by 
the group. The majority of training occurred through other job responsibilities,  
 I go to professional development with counseling dealing with all kinds of 
 situations and that helps me, but I bring that to the group. But having something 
 for all of us would be beneficial. I’ve perceived it to be just little pockets of this 
 and pulling it all together to see how all the units work together with a different 
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 goal in mind would be beneficial (Mayes, S., personal communication, September 
 11, 2017).  
Participants stated they preferred “training all together versus as a small bit by bit training 
individually” (Smith, M., personal communication, September 10, 2015). Additionally, 
another member supported this thought by reporting group training “helps to see the big 
picture and hear different perspectives” in working through a concern (Green, B., 
personal communication, September 11, 2015).  
Another member also agrees that group training would be beneficial for the team, 
however “the high cost” (Smith, M., personal communication, September 10, 2015) of 
national training and “the absence of key personnel” (Green, B., personal 
communication, September 11, 2015) in the same time period proved to be a roadblock 
for the professional development initiative. Participants expressed that during a period of 
waning state appropriations and budgets, “campus safety is not sexy” and may be “placed 
on the back burner” when up against other campus initiatives (Green, B., personal 
communication, September 11, 2015). Findings indicated the participants “attended local 
conferences at a neighboring university for basic threat assessment” (Smith, M., personal 
communication, September 11, 2015) or utilized “low or no-cost webinars” to address 
education for the team (Green, B., personal communication, September 10, 2015). 
Brownsville State College Summary 
 Each of the TABIT team members interviewed at BSC stated that the threat 
assessment team process contributed to campus safety.  All participants agreed that the 
transparency during development of the team and campus inclusion in the process 
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benefited team credibility. They also expressed multiple challenges for the threat 
assessment team on campus including various roles played by single individuals, 
confidentiality issues, as well as funding and training. Other challenges included the need 
for successful awareness and education campaigns for the campus community about the 
team and maintaining meetings throughout the semester. Although participants stated that 
the team was viewed in a positive light, faculty senate addressed the need for more 
communication to the campus community.  
Redwood State College 
 Redwood State College (RSC), located in a rural area of the state, conferred two-
year associate degrees with agricultural purposes as the primary focus. The campus visit 
to RSC occurred on a fall day during the semester. The campus bustled with students 
rushing to find a parking space and hurrying off to class. Not familiar with the campus, I 
asked a friendly student to point the way to Heritage Hall. This destination served as the 
location of participant interviews for the day. Like the previous institution, three 
interviews were conducted at this site to collect data about the threat assessment team on 
campus. The findings presented in this section were produced from the data obtained 
through the interviews and collected documents and artifacts. The findings encompassed 
team members’ perceptions of the threat assessment team on campus safety and the 
challenges involved with the threat assessment team. 
Perceptions of Threat Assessment Team 
 From the beginning of the interviews, participants from RSC expressed how the 
campus was different from many other colleges and universities throughout the state. 
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Because of the rural location, participants described BSC as “isolated” (Smith, Q., 
personal communication, October 28, 2015) and “a different duck” (Jones, B., personal 
communication, October 28, 2017). Most employees at the institution consisted of locals 
who have resided in the surrounding county for years, if not their entire lives. 
Furthermore, “outsiders do not stay here long because we are set in our ways” (Manning, 
D., personal communication, October 28, 2015). The following quote communicated this 
further,   
We do things different here. Our processes and programs don’t always look like 
the big universities, but it works. It may look redneck to outsiders, but it works for 
our students and people (Manning, D., personal communication, October 28, 
2015). 
Sentiments such as “our people do their best” (Smith, Q., personal communication, 
October 28, 2015) and “work hard with the resources we have” (Jones, B., personal 
communication, October 28, 2015), indicated the process may look very different from 
others.  Participants revealed they only see a few cases a year and these cases include 
issues such as disruptive students, students with mental health issues or post-traumatic 
stress disorder, or drug/alcohol issues. Crime statistics from the Annual Security Report 
revealed violations of drug/alcohol, burglary, vehicle theft, and two reports of rape in the 
residence hall. 
 Help, Not Hinder. Participants highlighted the purpose of the campus threat 
assessment team was an “obvious safety initiative” (Jones, B., personal communication, 
October 28, 2015), however they also described the threat assessment process as an 
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opportunity to “help, not hinder” a student in crisis (Manning, D., personal 
communication, October 28, 2015).  Furthermore, members reported that a person of 
concern always “has a redeeming moment or opportunity to make a change before a 
conduct approach is considered” (Manning, D., personal communication, October 28, 
2015). The finding of threat assessment as “help, not hinder” provided a shared vision 
(Smith, Q., personal communication, October 28, 2015). Members stated the opportunity 
to help those struggling students gave campus professionals a chance to intervene early 
and possibly reduce losing students to suspension,  
I think it is wrong to pile conduct charges on during a difficult time. And so my 
part is that I want it to be as fair as it possibly could be ... And recognize that 
sometimes people are depressed and do some of these concerning behaviors… it’s 
just a page in their life and we need to help them get through that (Manning, D., 
personal communication, October 28, 2015).  
 Members revealed the history of how threat assessment began as a campus safety 
initiative on campus. Like many institutions, Virginia Tech was cited as the critical 
incident for team formation, 
There wasn’t a specific violent incident that occurred on our campus prompting 
the start of our threat assessment team. It was more an answer to what was being 
observed across the nation with campus violence at places like Virginia Tech. We 
knew that we needed to learn the lessons observed from that tragic event and look 
for ways to identify and help students in crisis before tragedy (Smith, Q., personal 
communication, October 28, 2015).  
90 
 
The group believed the threat assessment team improved campus safety as it provided an 
avenue for discussion of issues. The threat assessment team became “a mirror for us to 
hold up” (Smith, Q., personal communication, October 28, 2015) and an “opportunity to 
see the holes in the fence” (Jones, B., personal communication, October 28, 2015) to 
create awareness of the issues students were experiencing during their time at RSC. The 
participants did not indicate if the discussion of these issues provided topics for future 
training or if they were only concerned with visualizing where there were gaps in their 
current resources or security measures. 
 Another reference of the “help” finding that the threat assessment team provided 
persons of concerns included statements heard from the school personnel. Participants 
claimed statements from the campus community about the threat assessment team 
included comments such as “a help line” (Jones, B., personal communication, October 
28, 2015) or “second chances” (Manning, D., personal communication, October 28, 
2015) and “provides a different path” (Smith, Q., personal communication, October 28, 
2015) instead of student conduct or possible criminal probes. As one member stated, “it’s 
needed for a campus our size to keep a pulse on the problems of our student body” 
(Manning, D., personal communication, October 28, 2015). 
 Annual Security Report. The annual security report provided a snapshot 
statistical view of crime on campus and was completed each year according to the Clery 
Act regulations. At the beginning of the report, one of the interviewees provided an 
introduction to the document and also stated the importance of safety and security at 
RSC. Crime statistics disclosed the types of violations at RSC included liquor and drug 
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law violations, vehicle theft, dating violence, rape, and aggravated assault over a period 
of three years as required by the Clery Act (Clery Act, 1990). 
 News articles on website. Several web articles promoted the concept of campus 
safety and what actions administration was taking to keep the student body, faculty, and 
staff protected while they attend class or work duties. One particular article promoted the 
education and training of participants that aided him in his job function of safety and 
security for the campus. This article also notified the campus that this individual served 
on the threat assessment team, and was identified as the law enforcement expert. 
Additionally, the article referenced the threat assessment team was seen as a safety 
initiative and attempts to stay up to date with current trends, equipment, and training 
including updating certifications, software, vehicles, etc., “Redwood State College makes 
campus security a priority through educating our staff and by offering them the most up-
to-date information, techniques and equipment” (Redwood State College, Ret. 10/15). 
 Additionally, RSC utilized the institutional website to promote various safety 
initiatives across campus. Recently, the campus completed a campus security audit to 
make the campus as safe as possible. These items included increased lighting and security 
cameras around various areas of campus. Also, promotion of the campus emergency 
notification system was highlighted, as well as the threat assessment team initiative.  
Challenges for the Threat Assessment Team 
 Consistent Meetings. One challenge that was identified by participants at RSC 
involved inconsistent meeting times for the threat assessment team. RSC conducted 
meetings as needed per threat assessment members. There was not dedicated time set 
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aside during the week or month for the threat assessment team to meet. The primary 
reason given for the lack of consistent meetings was the busy schedules of the group. 
Likewise, member referenced the fact that there was a lack of issues that came to the 
threat assessment team and “they are handled a different way” (Jones, B., personal 
communication, October 28, 2015). One member voiced a concern that not meeting 
frequently caused members not to be “fresh on the process” (Jones, B., personal 
communication, October 28, 2015) and “perhaps glaze over details that should be raising 
a flag” (Smith, Q., personal communication, October 28, 2015).  
 All members stated they should be meeting monthly regardless if there was a case 
to discuss or not. Although they reported they do not see the same number or type of 
concerns as the “big campuses” (Manning, D., personal communication, October 28, 
2015), all members recognized they may not be “catching issues” at the lowest possible 
level (Smith, Q., personal communication, October 28, 2015). Participants stated the 
threat assessment team does not receive many reports from the campus community and 
they only manage a few cases a year for issues such as disruptive students, students with 
mental health issues or post-traumatic stress disorder, or drug/alcohol issues. One person 
indicated most of the issues were managed by different processes such as student conduct 
or the criminal process. RSC’s threat assessment policy did not include a mission 
statement for the threat assessment team. Additionally, the policy stated  
members will meet monthly, or as needed to address all cases that have occurred 
during the previous 30 days … Additional meetings may be held to assess, 
intervene and monitor student/employee concerns brought to the attention of the 
TAT” (Redwood State College Threat Assessment Policy, p. 1).   
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 Many Roles. Like many two-year institutions throughout the area, RSC operated 
with a small number of employees in relation to enrollment. At RSC, faculty absorbed a 
large number of employees leaving staff to service students with lower numbers in the 
employee count. Therefore, this required staff at RSC to take on many different job 
responsibilities under one office. Dr. Smith provided an example, “on a four-year campus 
there is an office for student life, student conduct, and athletics. However, on the RSC 
campus all these job operations become the responsibility of one person” (Smith, Q., 
personal communication, October 28, 2015).  
This finding was reported in other interviews as the challenges of many job 
responsibilities continued to be described by this statement “so many wear so many 
different hats here that sometimes being able to focus on one task and doing it well 
suffers” (Manning, D., personal communication, October 28, 2015). Another articulated 
concern that one person on campus could hold a tremendous amount of power if they 
were responsible for multiple functions on campus stating,  
If someone holds the job responsibility of Title IX Coordinator, student conduct 
officer, residential hall director and student life, how are they supposed to do all 
of these jobs at a high level and keep on top of all the new practices? It’s 
impossible! That’s what we live with here (Smith, Q., personal communication, 
October 28, 2015). 
Counseling. RSC did not employ counselors on campus for students. The campus 
did not provide a counseling center to address student issues or crisis. This led to all 
participants reporting this as the biggest challenge facing not only the threat assessment 
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team, but the campus as a whole. An explanation shared “if a student is in need of 
counseling services, a referral is made to an outside agency in the county at the student’s 
expense” (Manning, D. personal communication, October 28, 2015). He commented 
further that the availability of funds to assist students with this service limited paid 
referrals. Funds designated for referrals continued to be earmarked for athletes on 
campus. Members concur that counseling is “a dire need” (Jones, B., personal 
communication, October 28, 2015) and “valued for the team process” (Smith, Q., 
personal communication, October 28, 2015),  however all recognized that “this will not 
be addressed in the near future due to the difficult budget period facing higher education” 
(Smith, Q., personal communication, October 28, 2015). Members expressed that the 
team acquired individual training to address some of the issues students reported such as 
mental health first aid, recognizing signs and symptoms of drug/alcohol abuse, and 
suicide prevention through the QPR Institute (Question, Persuade, Refer). However, none 
of the team members were licensed counselors. One member stated this point became a 
“fine line” to stay within the scope of employment for liability purposes (Smith, Q., 
personal communication, October 28, 2015).  
Awareness. The RSC team stated awareness of the team and purpose was a 
challenge moving forward. Statements such as “the tremendous amount of work to 
increase awareness” (Smith, Q., personal communication, October 28, 2015) and “proper 
advertisement could change perspectives of some who do not understand how the group 
functions” (Manning, D., personal communication, October 28, 2015) highlighted the 
groups’ belief of the need for more deliberate comprehensive awareness campaign. 
Likewise, the group expressed that better marketing could increase the use of the threat 
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assessment team to address student concerns at a lower level perhaps reaching students 
before they entered a full crisis stage.  
The team stated student notification of the threat assessment team needed to be 
more than a single email at the beginning of the semester and a brief introduction at 
faculty in-service. Student notification occurred at hall meetings at the beginning of the 
year to address how to report through the webpage, but a sustained marketing plan 
needed to be “developed and introduced” to the campus (Manning, D., personal 
communication, October 28, 2015). One member stated, “I’m concerned that students do 
not truly know where and how to report a safety or security concern to the threat 
assessment team” (Jones, B., personal communication, October 28, 2015).  
 Committee Leadership.  There were several questions concerning committee 
leadership asked of each of the participants at RSC. When asked about the chair or leader 
of the threat assessment team, all three interviewees answered this question differently. 
The written policy for RSC failed to address team leadership or who presided as chair of 
the committee. The policy only deciphered between core members and ad hoc 
membership, however the chairman position was void in the document.  
 Upon inquiring about who leads the meetings, statements differed about who 
filled this role on the team. One member reported that different members took the lead as 
they were equipped or if they attained more knowledge about the situation. Another 
participant disagreed and stated that there was a clear chair of the committee, the Vice 
President. The third member expressed that he served in the role of chair at most 
meetings because the initial reports came to his office and he was the person who called 
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the meeting after speaking with the Vice President. However, he stated that he was not 
assigned leadership by policy.  
 Training and Budget. Participants stated training presented a challenge for RSC 
as they continued to progress as a threat assessment team. The team referenced the 
struggle for all team members to be absent from campus at once,  
Again…coming from a small school … you wear so many different hats because 
you are doing so many different things. Trying to find a time to send four or five 
different people to training is kind of difficult because we do so much that many 
things stop when you are gone. It would be nice if everyone could go to some of 
that training like mental health or other type of training. We went to a table top 
exercise at another institution about active shooters on campus. But if you don’t 
get all your members there, it’s kind of a waste. Only a few people know what to 
do and everyone is waiting for someone to direct (Manning, D., personal 
communication, October 28, 2015). 
This statement found agreement within the interviews; however references to the cost 
involved with sending people to training showed the budget challenge in a time of 
strained budgets. 
We just don’t have the budget currently to send out team to the national trainings 
that seem to be so helpful. We have to be creative and look for partnerships for 
training. Webinars are our best bet to get everyone together at the same time just 
for the cost-savings that are involved (Smith, Q., personal communication, 
October 28, 2015). 
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  A different perspective about training surfaced from the participant interviews as 
the discussion focused on this topic. Participants at RSC stated that “training centered 
more on the individual roles of the team members instead of training of the team as a 
whole” (Jones, B., personal communication, October 28, 2015). These trainings 
concentrated on issues that addressed other job responsibilities, but supported the overall 
goal of threat assessment. Members’ referenced trainings in student conduct, crisis 
intervention, mental health, legal issues, CERT, suicide prevention, domestic and sexual 
violence, and risk management. Participants stated that the threat assessment philosophy 
received attention at these trainings, but was not focused on as the primary message.  
Summary for Redwood State College 
Members interviewed for this study from Redwood State College were in 
agreement that the perception of the threat assessment team process affected campus 
safety in a positive manner. Likewise, threat assessment served not only as another 
strategy for safety, but also as a help mechanism for students. The threat assessment 
policy provided the purpose for the team; however it lacked a clear and concise mission 
statement to guide the direction of the group.  
Several challenges in relation to threat assessment at RSC were voiced throughout 
the interview sessions. Interviewees acknowledged RSC struggled to meet consistently 
throughout the year for threat assessment even though policy stated they would meet 
monthly. Likewise, participants viewed the many roles they were responsible for 
hindered availability and leaving campus for training. The training and budget also 
presents obstacles for this smaller, rural college threat assessment team. Participants 
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stated training occurred individually through their respective offices, but lacked the 
funding for group or team training. Additionally, the team expressed the need for mental 
health counseling caused a critical barrier for the threat assessment team, as well as the 
institution; however this barrier tied directly to the budget difficulties that the higher 
education institution was experiencing. Finally, the lack of awareness of the threat 
assessment team to faculty, staff, and students surfaced as a challenge according to the 
group members.  
Cross-Case Findings 
The previous sections of this chapter described the findings from the individual 
institutions selected to be included in this multiple case study. The aforementioned two-
year higher education institutions were selected to reflect diversity in rural and urban 
settings. Additionally, this segment presented the findings of the two cases taken together 
that provided relevance to the research questions. A total of six interviews from two 
institutions were conducted for the study. Five mid-level administrators and one 
executive administrator were interviewed for data collection purposes. Three mid-level 
administrators held student services positions, two held safety and security 
responsibilities, and one served as an executive vice-president. Specific descriptions of 
these institutions and individuals were introduced in Chapter III. The cross-case findings 






Perceptions of Threat Assessment Teams and Campus Safety 
 The two-year colleges included in this study implemented threat assessment teams 
on campus as a safety initiative to identify students/persons of concern and provide 
resources or mechanisms to mitigate risk for the institution and student. Individuals from 
both colleges stated that a critical event did not occur at the institution; however national 
incidents of violence at colleges and universities led the respective campuses to look at 
best practices for safety, prevention and detection. The decision to start a threat 
assessment team as “the right thing to do … a structured response to a campus crisis” 
communicates the central themes about threat assessment teams – the perception of safety 
and the purpose to help (Smith, M., personal communication, October 28, 2015). Study 
participants communicated statements about threat assessment teams and campus safety. 
The findings that emerged included the perception of safety and the purpose to help. This 
section presents the findings as described by the participants concerning the perceptions 
of threat assessment and campus safety. 
 Campus Safety. Participants at both institutions considered threat assessment 
teams central to campus safety as the primary function of the group and process. Written 
policy at both colleges cited safety as the leading principle for implementing a threat 
assessment team. One participant verbalized threat assessment concisely, “threat 
assessment is a best practice for campus safety” (Smith, M., personal interview, 
September 10, 2015). Participants attributed a variety of comments to threat assessment 
teams such as “the use of transparency during process development and the credibility 
afforded to the team by administration” led to the successful transition to the threat 
assessment philosophy (Mayes, S., personal communication, September 11, 2015). The 
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belief that the threat assessment team concept improved campus safety by increasing 
awareness because it “adds another layer to patch the fence” suggested buy-in from group 
members (Jones, personal communication, October 28, 2015). Participants also credit 
support from administration as providing legitimacy and credibility to the team. This 
occurred by promoting efforts at the fall convocation, in-service, and campus documents 
such as the annual security report and the student handbook. Additionally, marketing 
inconsistencies of the team continued to provide barriers for threat assessment. 
 Help, Not Hinder. Members at both institutions referenced the threat assessment 
teams as being a “help” initiative for students who were struggling. One participant 
coined the phrase, “help, not hinder” when speaking of the additional purpose of the 
threat assessment team process (Smith, M. personal communication, September 10, 
2015). Several participants reported this system as an additional avenue to assist troubled 
students without accessing the conduct or criminal process if the situation did not rise to a 
threatening level. The BSC team stated that faculty was appreciative of this process 
because it appeared to be a true channel to raise concerns and provided resources to 
students without immediately triggering a code of conduct violation BSC’s mission 
statement includes thought in the mission statement to provide interventions without 
being punitive (BSC Threat Assessment Policy, p.1).  
Challenges for Threat Assessment Teams on Two-Year Campus 
 Participants at both sites referenced challenges for their campuses concerning 
threat assessment and the team. Some of these challenges were common at both 
institutions and some were different. Both institutions commented that the many job 
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functions one person was responsible for on a two-year campus as a challenge. 
Participants also pointed to training as a significant obstacle because of budget 
constraints. Likewise, comments from members at both institutions identified the 
difficulties of marketing the team to appropriately communicate the presence and purpose 
of the team on campus as a challenge. Finally, members voiced that the inconsistent 
meeting times was a complication. Participants expressed issues that were not shared at 
both sites. These challenges included the need for counseling, team leadership, and 
confidentiality of the team. 
 Participants at both sites reported challenges that indicated the “many roles” 
individuals cover as a challenge for threat assessment teams on two-year campuses 
(Green, B., Jones, B., Manning, D., Mayes, S., Smith, M., and Smith, Q., personal 
interviews, September 10-11, 2015 and October 28, 2015). At RSC, a member reported 
he was responsible for student life, student conduct, Title IX, athletics, housing, and 
leadership while another subject at BSC stated he was responsible for security, 
occupational safety, contract security, and threat assessment. A third individual explained 
that he was responsible for student conduct, Title IX, threat assessment, and residential 
life. Individuals stated that these job duties required significant time and attention and 
therefore it became difficult to find time when the entire team could be trained for threat 
assessment.  Likewise, it was noted that one person covering multiple responsibilities 
allowed for one person on the threat assessment team to cover several viewpoints 
(housing, conduct, etc.). Participants stated this concern as something each team worked 
through regularly.  
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 The teams also communicated struggles that were dissimilar from each other. 
RSC members expressed that the biggest challenge for the threat assessment team, 
process, and campus was the lack of counseling at the institution. One member stated this 
barrier was directly related to the cost to employ a licensed counselor in the rural area, 
and was not expected to change in the foreseeable future with the current budget 
constraints facing higher education. 
 Another finding difference between the two institutions concerned team 
leadership designation. All members at RSC quoted a different person as the leader of the 
group with one person stating that there was not a designated leader for each meeting, but 
whoever was appropriate to lead for that specific issue stepped forward.  
The final difference noted in the findings was the issue of confidentiality. While 
BSC participants stated the current team held confidentiality of cases in the highest 
regard, it provided challenges in appropriately staffing the team. Members stated some 
areas remained unrepresented on the threat assessment team because of the concern that 
confidentiality would not be held by some as required in possible cases.  
Summary 
 This chapter presented the findings from the interviews and documents collected 
for the cases included in this study. This chapter highlighted the findings for the two 
community colleges that participated as two individual case studies. Each of the case 
findings were presented including perceptions of threat assessment on campus safety and 
challenges for threat assessment teams at two-year community colleges. Finally, this 
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chapter concluded with cross-case findings of both cases taken together to address the 
research questions for this study. 
 The discussion and analysis of the findings will be presented in Chapter V in 
reference to the research questions, pertinent literature, and the theoretical lens as 
described in the methodology. Study limitations will be discussed, as well as the research 







Chapter IV presented the findings of the individual case studies for each of the 
community colleges included in the study, along with the cross-case findings of both 
sites. A review of the problem statement, research questions, study methodology and 
summarized findings will be reported in Chapter V. Additionally, this chapter will 
discuss research and theory relevant to this study, implications for practice, limitations to 
the study, and offer recommendations for future research. 
Statement of the Problem 
Higher education continued to investigate preventative strategies to implement on 
campus with hopes to decrease incidents of violence. Administrators, regents, trustees, 
and legislators turned to recommendations by the U.S. Secret Service and the FBI to 
incorporate threat assessment teams into campus emergency plans (Vossekuil et al., 
2002; O’Toole, 2000). As threat assessment was embraced by institutions, the promotion 
of best practices for creation of these teams was also marketed.  Established best 
practices for campus threat assessment teams identified that the inclusion of specific 
campus professionals, written policy, and team training were critical for an effective and
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multi-disciplinary approach in identifying, investigating, evaluating, and managing a 
person of concern on college campuses (Cornell, 2010; Deisinger et al., 2008; Randazzo 
& Cameron, 2011; Sokolow et al., 2011; Van Brunt, 2012). Effective teams included 
representatives from student conduct, campus security, mental health counseling, and the 
dean of students or student affairs. Other campus professionals were also included, 
though the previously mentioned representatives are considered the core membership of 
threat assessment teams (Sokolow et al., 2011; Van Brunt, 2012). Likewise, written 
policy and training team members allowed for members to have the appropriate resources 
to increase the knowledge base to conduct campus threat assessment effectively.  
Consequently, two-year colleges may not include critical membership components, 
written policies and processes, or member training in threat assessment team 
development as recommended by best practices for successful team operation (Cornell, 
2010; Randazzo & Cameron, 2011; Sokolow et al., 2011; Van Brunt, 2012). Limited 
resources at two-year colleges hinder institutions to sufficiently staff and train threat 
assessment team members appropriately. 
Research Questions 
 The purpose of this study was to explore the perceptions of the threat assessment 
team’s impact on campus safety, as well as perceptions of barriers or challenges for the 
campus threat assessment teams. The study focused on the following research questions: 
1. What is the perception of threat assessment team’s impact on the current state of 
campus safety on two-year college campuses? 
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2. How do threat assessment team members at two-year colleges describe perceived 
challenges or barriers for the threat assessment process? 
3. How does the threat assessment team perception of risk shape the threat 
assessment process at the institution? 
Review of Methodology 
As stated in Chapter III, this study followed a constructivist worldview coupled 
with a qualitative research methodology by utilizing multiple case studies (Yin, 2014). 
The study explored the perceptions and understanding of campus safety and threat 
assessment teams by team members at two separate two-year colleges in a Midwestern 
state of the United States. Data collection from the participating institutions included 
documents and artifacts related to the institution’s campus safety policies and threat 
assessment team. Likewise, three interviews consisting of two team members and an 
administrator were conducted at each site location. These data collection methods, along 
with member checks supported the trustworthiness or validity of the data (Patton, 2002). 
All interviews were transcribed for further analysis including initial open coding by using 
MAXQDA12 software to aid in the identification of general themes within the collected 
documents and interviews. Furthermore, data was analyzed for critical incidents and 
Member Meanings as described by Emerson (Emerson et al., 1995). More detailed 
methodology for this study is included in Chapter III. 
Summary of the Findings 
Participants at both institutions subscribed to the definition of threat assessment as 
a deductive, comprehensive approach to identify, gather and evaluate data, and the 
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management of an individualized plan to mitigate the concern (Deisinger, et al., 2008). 
Members of both teams stressed the critical component that threat assessment provided to 
campus security. Although neither college experienced a life-threatening event on the 
campus leading to the formation of the threat assessment team, participants did credit the 
change in national attitude pertaining to college safety after the incident at Virginia Tech 
for the development and implementation of their processes. Written policy for both 
institutions was included in the internal document collection. However, only one 
institution developed a mission statement to include the following:   
balance the individual needs of the student and those of the greater campus 
 community, provide a structured positive method for addressing student behaviors 
 that impact the campus community and may involve mental health and/or safety 
 issues, manage each case individually, initiate appropriate intervention without 
 immediately resorting to punitive measures, and to eliminate fragmented care 
 (Brownsville State College Threat Assessment Policy, p.1)   
Although members of Redwood State College do have written policy and a purpose 
statement that included "to promote a safe college learning environment for all students 
and to create a safe and secure work environment for employees", a developed mission 
statement was not provided within the policy (Redwood State College Threat Assessment 
Policy, p. 1).  
Members across both institutions voiced safety as the primary purpose for threat 
assessment on campus. Furthermore, participants also highlighted the “help” philosophy 
of the team to provide the necessary resources to identified persons of concern as a 
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secondary purpose. This viewpoint held as much importance as the safety component of 
threat assessment according to participants. According to interviewees, there was a 
perception by faculty that threat assessment provided another beneficial avenue to help a 
student, rather than only triggering the conduct process when managing difficult students. 
Likewise, participants stated the transparency of team formation aided this perception. 
Team members reported the addition of threat assessment to other campus safety 
initiatives as a best practice. Members at both institutions stated that the promotion of the 
threat assessment team occurred during faculty in-service or through the student 
handbook or webpage. However, they recognized that a comprehensive awareness plan 
needed to be developed and initiated in the near future to maintain awareness. Members 
reported that the administration support of the threat assessment team lends creditability 
to the team. 
There were several challenges or barriers referenced by participants related to 
threat assessment on the two-year campus. Mid-level administrators reported the many 
roles that one employee held at the two-year campus as a challenge for threat assessment. 
Additionally, participants stated that one person may hold the viewpoint for several key 
roles normally included in the process. For example, one mid-level administrator held 
responsibility for conduct, housing, Title IX, athletics, student life, and leadership 
programs. This provided a concern for the appropriate staffing of the team to allow for 
adequate viewpoints during discussion of cases. Furthermore, participants stated that 
training team members presented challenges as it became difficult for multiple 
individuals to be gone from campus at the same time. Additionally, the team reported a 
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lack of qualified individuals to serve on the team in a confidential manner resulted in 
some areas on campus not being represented. 
Personnel training continued to represent a challenge for two-year college 
campuses to assure proper threat assessment occurred as reported by team members. 
Members stated that training without the complete group did little to advance the efforts 
of the process or the team. Additionally, members expressed the cost attached to national 
training became a barrier as there was little to no budget dedicated to the threat 
assessment team. Participants voiced that in a period of limited budget dollars, threat 
assessment experienced difficulty competing with other campus initiatives including 
recruitment and retention. 
Shared challenges at both institutions included promoting awareness of the team 
to the campus constituency and consistent meeting times. Members’ referenced minimal 
promotional efforts were made to the entire institution and admitted that current 
marketing efforts focused mostly on faculty and staff, although the annual security report 
and the student handbook referenced the threat assessment team to the general population 
and students. Participants stated that a comprehensive awareness plan to encompass 
promotion to students with yearlong campaign activities was needed. The teams voiced 
challenges and barriers that were significant to the individual institutions, but were not 
similar to each other.  
Discussion 
Campus safety remained a critical topic as various acts of violence continue to 
grab headlines nationally. Following violent events at colleges and universities in 2007, 
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the establishment of threat assessment teams as a best practice for campus security began 
seeing traction within the higher education arena (Randazzo & Cameron, 2012). Maria 
Randazzo reminded, "a pathway to violence can be detoured if someone reports the 
behavior to the right authorities" (Wilson, 2016, Para 15).   
Thus, the concept of threat assessment follows the path of prevention and 
determent. All of the participants for this study emphasize the importance of the threat 
assessment team to campus safety at their respective institutions. The findings from the 
data provide information that can be categorized into the following areas: the lack of 
resources, the state and challenges of mental health, and the cultural lens or bias that the 
threat assessment teams at two-year colleges operate within naturally. 
Perception of Campus Safety  
The results of this study suggest that team members’ perceptions of the threat 
assessment process include a positive impact on campus safety. Furthermore, team 
members report this process provides a “help, not hinder” philosophy to aid students, 
who are in need of resources, not necessarily a conduct charge (Manning, D., personal 
communication, October 28, 2015). However, participants state the primary function of 
the threat assessment teams’ are to provide another avenue to address campus safety as 
supported by the purpose statements within each institution’s policy.  
In order to promote the safety and health of its students, the TABIT addresses 
 alleged concerning student behaviors that are disruptive and include mental health 
 and/or safety issues (Brownsville State College Threat Assessment Policy, p.1)  
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The overall purpose of the development and implementation of a Threat 
 Assessment Team (TAT) is to promote a safe college learning environment for all 
 students and to create a safe and secure work environment for employees 
 (Redwood State College Threat Assessment Policy, p. 1).  
Although threat assessment teams are primarily a safety initiative, the help and 
care factor weighs heavily into the threat assessment team purpose. Team members 
perceive a dual responsibility for their purpose with referring student to resources needed 
considered as mutually important. This philosophy holds strong value to the group as 
evidenced by the following statement, “the more we are aware of those who are hurting 
or in need of help, the better we are to address those needs early and keep them here” 
(Smith, M. personal communication, September 10, 2015).  The strategy to provide help 
initiatives and advocate for students serves as a strong perception as the benefit of threat 
assessment on campus. he mission statement for BSC's team promotes this function as 
well, " … provide a structured positive method for addressing student behaviors that 
impact the campus community and may involve mental health and/or safety initiatives … 
initiate appropriate intervention without immediately resorting to punitive measures" 
(Brownsville State College Threat Assessment Policy, p. 1).  However, these statements 
may point to a different reason for the “help, not hinder” philosophy. Ultimately, these 
perceptions pin threat assessment as a retention and graduation strategy instead of a 
safety mechanism. Shrinking budgets, decreased enrollments, and future budget 
dollars associated to performance-based funding makes every student enrollment critical 
for retention and graduation rates at two-year colleges. The National Center for 
Education Statistics through the Integrated Post Secondary Data System (IPEDS) 
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provides retention and graduation data for both institutions. Retention rates for BSC from 
fall 2014 to fall 2015, reports 54 percent retention rate for full-time students and 33 
percent for part-time students. The graduation rate for students beginning coursework in 
fall 2012 is reported at 16% (National Center of Education Statistics, 2016). Retention 
rates for RSC from fall 2014 to fall 2015, reports 54 percent retention rate for full-time 
students and 29 percent for part-time students. The graduation rate for students beginning 
coursework in fall 2012 is reported at 16 percent with 29 percent of students 
transferring out before completing a degree (National Center 
of Education Statistics, 2016). With lower numbers of students graduating, a small loss of 
students from an institution can drastically affect these percentages, providing pressure to 
keep students enrolled for future budgetary dollars over separation for safety of the 
university.  
Challenges for Threat Assessment Teams on Two-Year Campuses 
 These teams experience challenges that may result in negative or unintended 
consequences for the threat assessment team process. Two-year colleges serve 40 percent 
of all college freshmen in the United States (American Association of Community 
Colleges, 2015). Upon separating out the diversity groups, these numbers paint a telling 
story with 61 percent of Native American enrollment, 57 percent Hispanic, 51 percent of 
African American, and 43 percent of Asian American enrollment (AACC, 2015). 
However, “Public community colleges have seen large decreases in state funding over the 
past years, state funding decreased from 36 percent in 2008-09 to 30 percent in 2013-14” 
(American Association of Community Colleges, 2015, p.1).  
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In this Midwestern state of the United States, the downturn in the oil and gas 
industry impacted tax collections leading to a monumental budget crisis. The state 
agencies experienced budget reductions multiple times throughout the year. RSC 
experienced cuts that equaled $442,000 or 6.5 percent of the budget (OSRHE, 2016). The 
FY 2017 budget saw reductions of 7.9 percent. Likewise, BSC saw the FY 2017 budget 
reduced by 4.6 percent (OSRHE, 2016). Historically, two-year colleges often assign 
multiple functions deemed critical to one individual to save on manpower and cost. When 
budget reductions in allocation occurred, two-year institutions plugged the gap by staff 
reduction in the form of hiring freezes resulting in less staff. Although beneficial as a 
cost-savings standpoint for the college, for threat assessment it hindered the possibility to 
collect various viewpoints for assessing behaviors of concern. For example, on a four-
year campus, the team consisted of student conduct, counseling, residential life, and Dean 
of Students or Vice President of Student Affairs. At two-year institutions, these job 
responsibilities were conducted by one or two people. Some members struggled with 
meeting attendance required by the threat assessment team. With individuals carrying 
numerous responsibilities, meeting cancellations were not uncommon. Moreover, it could 
be argued that groups choosing to meet on an “as needed” basis may not be operating as a 
true threat assessment team according to NaBita best practices (Sokolow & Lewis, 2009).  
 When meeting cancellations occur, typically the training meetings become 
compromised. This provides challenges for unified group training, as it becomes difficult 
for a team of individuals to all be absent at once for multiple days. Additionally, this 
study suggests that budget constraints negatively impact attending training opportunities 
because threat assessment must compete with other program initiatives for limited 
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budgetary dollars. Budget line items dedicated for training conferences and travel become 
extinct when discretionary dollars are absorbed in budget cuts. Consequently, institutions 
attempt to train members by placing training responsibilities on the individual or by 
sending a representative to training to return and share knowledge with the remaining 
team members. Another training method includes research of free whitepapers or low-
cost webinars about relevant safety and security information for team distribution and 
discussion. Although team members reflect this is “better than nothing” (Green, B., 
personal communication, October 28, 2015), a level of frustration acknowledges that 
training seems pieced together in the current format as the group could not attend 
together.  
 Best practice for threat assessment identifies appropriate training for the team as 
critical to educate the team about process, interviewing skills, document collection, 
specific concerns such as mental health, suicide, post-traumatic stress disorder, etc., 
record management, and case management (Deisinger et al., 2008).  The lack 
of training resources at two-year colleges impact threat assessment teams in applying best 
practices as promoted by experts in the field. These threat assessment teams’ manage 
cases related to drug/alcohol violations, suicidal ideation, post-traumatic stress disorder, 
mental health disorders, and disruptions in the classroom. Knowing the implications of 
the American Disabilities Act (ADA) would be important for these teams to properly 
address appropriate strategies and interventions without violating the ADA. For example, 
teams should know and understand protections afforded to students with mental illness or 
that the Department of Justice states that a direct threat does not include a threat to 
oneself in the case of suicidal ideation (Gignac, 2013; McBain, 2008; American 
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Disabilities Act, 1973). Appropriate training would address these implications and also 
identify strategies to provide appropriate interventions for these students such as the 
student conduct process or mandated psychological evaluations (Gignac, 2013; McBain, 
2008). Additionally, understanding how FERPA applies to student records and what can 
be shared according to educational interests is critical for a team (Family Education 
Rights & Privacy Act, 1974; Lipka, 2008; Simon, 2008). Training regarding relevant 
legal cases about liability for colleges is important as understanding the courts views of 
shared duty sheds light on how decisions may be viewed by the courts (Tarasoff v. 
Regents of the University of California (1976); Shinn v. Massachusetts (2005); Hoffman, 
2013).  
 Although only one institution does not have counseling services available for 
students, both reference counseling as a struggle for the threat assessment teams. As 
stated previously in Chapter II, the International Association of Counseling recommends 
a student to counselor ratio of 1 to 1500 (International Association of Counseling, 2010, 
Para 2). Following this recommendation, RSC should employ one to one and a half 
counselors to address mental health/counseling needs. Likewise, BSC currently 
employees one and a half counselors but according to this ratio should have four full-time 
counselors to aid the student body.  
 Counseling presents the most difficult challenge for RSC’s threat assessment 
team. The institution does not offer counseling to students, nor is there a mental health 
counselor on staff. RSC attempts to offset this by placing a faculty member from the 
psychology department on the team. Although this provides a textbook knowledge, this 
team member does not serve as a practicing mental health counselor and for liability 
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purposes it remains important that this individual works within the scope of employment. 
As such, this team member expresses knowledge of mental health; however, it would be 
inappropriate for this person to make suggestions or recommendations from a practitioner 
viewpoint as this is outside the employment duties. Therefore, the missing role of the 
counselor continues to be an issue of concern. A team member states,  
We don’t have campus counseling and we need it. I think in most TATs that 
somebody with that kind of training tends to be on those teams and I can see 
where that would be valuable to have that knowledge and experience (Manning, 
D., personal communication, October 28, 2015). 
The administrator responsible for threat assessment at RSC recognizes the critical need 
for counseling on campus to aid the study body and the team. However, he voices that in 
the time of strained budgets, it is not likely a mental health counselor will be hired in the 
near future. The decision to employ a new counselor battles against new hires such as 
faculty, front line staff in areas of student services, recruitment, and advisement. At RSC, 
hiring a licensed practical counselor requires a high salary and a person willing to live in 
a rural location. This proves to be a significant challenge for the rural institution. 
Therefore, the administrator perceives high competition for hiring a campus counselor 
when compared to other campus positions and initiatives able to stretch budget dollars. 
 In 2010, the CLASS Task Force survey of colleges and universities researched 
safety and security initiatives following the shooting at Virginia Tech. Questions asked of 
the institutions included the topic of campus counseling. This study found that, “52% of 
all colleges and universities have only one or two counselors … 12.9% report no 
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counseling services on campus” (p.11). The Association of Community Colleges and the 
Wisconsin HOPE lab conducted a study of 4000 students at community colleges in six 
states – California, Louisiana, New Jersey, New York, and Wyoming (Eisenberg, 
Goldrick-Rabi, Lipson & Broton, 2016). The authors claimed that mental health was a 
wider concern for community colleges as these students entered with a variety of life 
stressors and “broader public health issues” than their four-year counterparts (Eisenberg, 
Goldrick-Rabi, Lipson & Broton, 2016, p.1). Issues such as family pressure, financial 
struggles, balancing time between work and school requirements all served as sources of 
emotional unrest and some two-year students did not know where to turn to find 
resources (Eisenberg et al., 2016). Additionally, the findings presented a stressed  student 
body with almost half reporting a current or recent mental health problem with 
depression (36%) and anxiety (29%) cited as the most common disorders (Eisenberg et 
al., 2016, p.9). These overall mental health problem numbers were higher than reported 
by the four-year counterparts (Eisenberg et al., 2016). Unfortunately, only ten percent of 
two-year institutions reported offering onsite psychiatry resources. Likewise, two-year 
colleges that did offer counseling did so at counselor to student ratio of 1 to 3000 
compared to 1 in 1600 at four-year institutions (Gallagher, 2015). Both of the institutions 
included in this study are described by the abovementioned statements with an older 
student population, little or no counseling services, and a variety of life stressors.  
 Coupled with counseling inadequacies and dire financial resources such as those 
at BSC and RSC, these scenarios prescribe an equation for disaster. The absence of 
mental health counselors or low prevalence of counselors for threat assessment teams 
allows for opportunities for individuals who need help to slip through the cracks. The 
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mental health counselor proves to be a critical component to the threat assessment team 
as per best practice. Because of this inadequacy, the argument can be made that threat 
assessment teams at two-year colleges may be missing the mark. 
This study also suggests that although institutions know that awareness for threat 
assessment needs to be promoted to the entire campus community, promotional efforts 
target faculty and staff only, failing to adequately message to students. The promotion of 
awareness campaigns at BSC and RSC lack a comprehensive strategy to communicate to 
all campus constituents. This produces a disconnect between the threat assessment team 
and a valued source of information, the students themselves. Currently, the teams receive 
reference in the Annual Security Report and the Student Handbook, both available to 
students. However, these publications prove lengthy and arduous to read. Neither 
institution distributes promotional materials dedicated to the purpose and process of 
threat assessment.  
Participants at both colleges recognize that promoting awareness of the team to 
the student body needs improvement. Student input is important and students may supply 
a unique voice or perspective as a fellow peer. If the student body is not aware of the 
threat assessment team process and how to report concerns, opportunities to intervene 
early could be missed. Likewise, if faculty and staff lack awareness of the threat 
assessment team or the purpose and function of the team, then the effectiveness of the 
safety initiative may be lessened. The funding issues two-year institutions experience, 
require available dollars to be stretched as far as possible. Again, in the age of competing 




This study also illustrates that institutions experience individual challenges that 
serve as barriers that are not consistent over both institutions. However, these challenges 
relate to best practices suggested for threat assessment teams and therefore they should be 
addressed. BSC stresses the importance that the team practices confidentiality at its 
highest regard. For the campus counselor, this tenant becomes vital for her continued 
relationships with student clients. The balance of maintaining the counselor-client 
relationship and sharing relevant information to TABIT must be considered. Current law 
gives the counselor authority to disclose with proper authorities per the Tarasoff ruling if 
a person’s life is threatened.  However, the counselor can provide information if a student 
is known to counseling without disclosing confidential details of the client. However, the 
counselor can provide information if a student is known to counseling without disclosing 
confidential details of the client. All members state that the group considers 
confidentiality one of its most important core values. Because of this, some work areas 
that may want to be included on the team are omitted due to lack of eligible candidates to 
serve in a confidential manner. The following statements represent the perception of 
importance of confidentiality for BSC,  
It’s hard … you feel like you are excluding people and you have people who 
really want to be involved. The good thing … is they really understand the 
confidentiality piece of our policy (Smith, M., personal communication, 
September 10, 2015.  
Information could be leaked if the team is too big and a student could be 
stigmatized by the campus community (Mayes, S., personal communication, 
September 11, 2015) 
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Likewise, another viewpoint from another participant, “the pool is so small that on this 
campus there is no one that I would probably select that we could have confidence in to 
keeping the information confidential” (Green, B., personal communication, September 
11, 2015). This creates a smaller, tight-knit group to decipher incoming information and 
how it translates for the team. The NaBita Survey states the average team consists of 
eight to nine members (Van Brunt, Sokolow, Lewis, Schuster, & Golston, 2014). This 
team functions with five members to address all concerns and members hold multiple 
viewpoints. Discussions that occur within threat assessment meetings must be held with 
the highest confidentiality because of the sensitive nature of the information. Team 
members should be concerned about keeping details confidential; however qualified 
professionals should be included if appropriate for the team and trained about the 
confidentiality expectation. 
 Finally, both institutions maintain paper files for case documentation and to 
provide a record of case management. The Dean of Students and the Chief of Security 
houses these paper files for Brownsville State College and Redwood State College 
respectively. One institution states they were converting to an online database case 
management system to aid in the tracking of these cases. Participants from both teams 
state that student follow up is assigned to an individual who then becomes responsible to 
report back to the team any issues or findings that need to be addressed. One team 
discusses these cases at their monthly meetings until that student is removed from case 
management, leaves the institution or graduates. However, the other institution only 
discusses the case management if the person assigned to manage the case notifies 
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the committee. The later example does not follow best practice and may place liability on 
the institution by the campus knowing issues, but failing to act on them appropriately.  
 As discussed in the literature, the courts’ viewpoint of liability has shifted from in 
loco parentis to no duty to shared duty (Bradshaw v. Rawlings (3
rd
 Cir. 1979); Furek v. 
University of Delaware (Del. 1991; Tarasoff v. Board of Regents of the University of 
California (Cal. 1976). This shared duty holds both students and institutions responsible 
for safety. Threat assessment team will open institutions to some level of possible 
liability with this shared responsibility. Before the Shin v. Institute of Massachusetts 
(2005) case was settled, the courts signaled the institution’s treatment team may have had 
a special relationship and a duty to warn her family about her suicidal ideation. Case 
management documents revealed the institution knew she was struggling mentally. This 
case demonstrated the importance of follow up, documentation, understanding the 
health/safety exception of FERPA and the Tarasoff rule for threat assessment. Likewise, 
poor case management provided opportunities for liability to be assessed. These same 
issues may be in play for the sites included in this study as the case management and 
follow up are not up to par to best practice.  
 These challenges suggest that proper threat assessment is not occurring at these 
two institutions according to best practice. The table below identifies best practices 
utilized at each institution. This visual shows that Brownsville State College engages in 
ten of fifteen best practice strategies for threat assessment teams regularly. Likewise, 




Table 5.1 Site best practice identification  
Best practice  Brownsville State College  
(Urban institution)  
Redwood State College  
(Rural institution)  
Fixed Membership  X  X  
Campus Counselor  X    
Meet regularly  X    
Standardized procedures/policies  X    
Mission Statement  X    
Address threat and provides resources  X  X  
Utilize mandated psychological 
assessment  
X    
Invoke involuntary withdrawal 
policies  
  X  
Use of rubric  X    
Comprehensive reporting structure      
Train and educate campus community      
Comprehensive tracking databases      
Focuses on students and employee 
behaviors  
  X  
Mechanism to “mind the gap”  X    
Integration with other risk 
management processes  
X    
  
  
 In the following section, the findings of this study will be discussed in relation to 
relevant research. Also, the implications for practice and research including Cultural 
Theory will be considered. Finally, the limitations of this study and future research 
recommendations will be presented. 
Findings in Relation to Relevant Research 
 The findings of this study were consistent with previous research on perception of 
campus safety. Woolfolk (2013) wrote in his Mercer University study about perceptions 
of campus safety that “perceptions are strong indicators of how individuals view their 
world” (p. 129). Previous studies found that parents, students, faculty, staff and 
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administrators believe the campus is a safe place (Janosik, 2004; Janosik & Gehring, 
2003; Janosik & Gregory, 2002; Janosik & Gregory, 2009; Patton & Gregory, 2014; 
Santucci & Gable, 1998; Woolfolk, 2013). However, these studies also emphasized that 
the community did not access the safety data supplied by the Annual Security Report. A 
majority of people perceived their exposure to danger was less than the average person 
(May, 2007). Likewise, Vermillion (2006) emphasized that the general public was not 
aware of crime or crime rates; however they still believed that campus crime was on the 
rise.  
The participants of this study perceive that the threat assessment process adds to 
other strategies to make the campus safe. Team members view the campus as a safe place 
overall as long as people remain aware of their surroundings. Additionally, participants 
believe the process of threat assessment provides the campus another preventative 
technique.  
 The findings of this study related to threat assessment teams at two-year colleges’ 
center around best practices (Deisinger et al., 2008; Randazzo & Plummer, 2007; Van 
Brunt, 2013; Van Brunt et al., 2014). These best practices suggest that teams do the 
following: set membership, established chair, regular meetings, member training, written 
mission statements and operating protocols, utilize case management record systems, 
utilize psychological assessments, invoke withdrawal policies, use rubrics, train and 
educate the campus, and focus on both student and employee concerns  (Deisinger et al., 
2008; Randazzo & Plummer, 2007; Sokolow & Hughes, 2007). Both of these teams’ 
perceive they operate as a functioning threat assessment team, however the omissions of 
best practice provides gaps that reduce their effectiveness. Additionally, most research 
124 
 
addresses higher education at the four-year level and does not focus on the two-year 
school perspective. This research is significant as the two-year campus brings different 
challenges from the four-year selective admission counterparts, and this study provides 
more data to the growing literature stream of threat assessment. However, as a qualitative 
study it would not be appropriate to make generalizations to the population.  
 Best practices identify key personnel as crucial for threat assessment to be 
conducted appropriately including mental health counseling, student conduct, security, 
legal counsel, residential life, and student affairs (Deisinger, Randazzo, & O’Neill, 2008; 
Keller, Hughes, & Hertz, 2011; Sokolow & Lewis, 2009). The participants included in 
this case study reveal that some identified personnel deemed critical are missing because 
these positions are not available on campus. For one case, the mental health counselor 
position is vacant. The counselor function explains the mental health component and if 
missing voids a critical viewpoint to the threat assessment team.  The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics reports that the median pay for a mental health counselor in the area stands at 
$44,610 (www.bls.gov, Retrieved 10/5/16) plus a conservative benefit rate of 30% 
equaling a total salary package of $58,000. Finding funds to add this level of employee 
continues to be a challenge for institutions. Both cases lack a representative from legal 
counsel that sits directly on the team. Nevertheless, teams do consult with legal counsel 
as needed although this does not happen immediately without higher administration 
approval. 
  These teams struggle with meeting consistency and frequency for threat 
assessment. The failure to meet consistently does not support best practice as previously 
identified. NaBita recommends a schedule of standing meetings to assure the group is 
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meeting regularly to discuss issues. When meetings occur where there are no issues up 
for discussion, NaBita recommends that team training should take place (Sokolow & 
Lewis, 2009). Participants from both institutions state there are times when it becomes 
difficult to meet during previously scheduled meeting times. One site states that they 
currently only meet as needed leading the question to be if this still makes them a 
functioning team. Although these teams know training needs to occur, both groups voice 
that, instead of scheduling training during periods of absent case management, meetings 
are cancelled. The NaBita survey of institutions reports a variety of meeting frequency 
including weekly, bi-weekly, monthly, once per semester, and as needed with the last two 
mentioned reported at 3 percent and 10 percent (Van Brunt et al., 2014). Although reports 
of meeting frequency vary, there is support for a higher number of meetings to assure 
cases are managed correctly and effectively.  
Relevance of Findings to Theory 
 Cultural Theory functions as the theoretical framework lens to view data and to 
uncover how threat assessment teams assign risk and make decisions as a unit. 
Specifically, this theory addresses how groups assess and assign risk to various issues or 
behaviors (Douglas & Wildsvasky, 1982). CT operates under the assumption that 
“culture is a system that holds one another mutually accountable” (Douglas, 1992, p. 31) 
The theory suggests that people, groups, or systems choose what to fear in relation to 
their cultural biases and these biases bind people together in working groups (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982). CT’s Group-Grid model discussed in Chapter II is a two-dimensional 
model that describes how groups work together. The group dimension portrays how 
strongly the group is bonded together and how they relate to one another. The grid 
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dimension explains how different or similar job roles are and how dependent the 
members are on each other to function (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). The four biases 
referenced are hierarchal, individualist, egalitarian, and fatalist. Likewise, the worldview 
to which a person relates determines how they perceive fear and risk.  
 The study presents a variety of questions aimed to examine the perceptions of 
how team members view risk as an individual, but more importantly as a team. The data 
suggest that the threat assessment team members in this study perceive that they operate 
within the high group/low grid quadrant, or egalitarian. CT is applicable to this study 
regarding threat assessment teams because they make decisions related to fear and risk. 








Utilizing the Cultural Theory lens, each of the threat assessment teams identified 
with the egalitarian quadrant on the theory’s Group-Grid model. Both teams’ shared 
common demographics as both groups function as open admission institutions. Although 
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their environments differ as rural or urban institutions, the groups experienced some 
similarities with residence halls, faculty to student ratio, and similar budget challenges. 
The following characteristics of the egalitarian sector included descriptions such as 
partnerships, group solidarity, peer pressure, mutualism and cooperation (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982).  
The egalitarian within this theory functions with a shared focus in collaborative 
efforts, as a tight-knit group moving forward towards a common goal. Members identify 
with this characteristic by stating that “we come up with a plan of action for that student 
and it is a collaborative approach” (Mayes, S., personal communication, September 11, 
2015) and “we are a tight-knit group united in purpose to aid students and keep the 
campus safe” (Green, B., personal communication, September 11, 2015).  Furthermore, 
these groups take personal ownership in decision-making. Although both sites include 
written policy addressing threat assessment and the process for collecting data, 
participants operate under few rules and procedures for the inner workings of the team. 
However, the institution ultimately decides what risks are acceptable by defining threats 
within policy but the teams maintain the autonomy to make recommendations or act as 
needed. These groups function under the assumption that all “have the same levels of 
involvement – same voice … same input” (Smith, M., personal communication, 
September 10, 2015). Team members in this study perceive their workings as 
collaboration with little structured leadership. Participants describe the decision-making 
process as “assessing the situation per policy and threat assessment tool and then coming 
to a consensus” (Smith, M., personal communication, September 10, 2015) and “coming 
to a consensus with an equal voice” (Smith, Q., personal communication, October 28, 
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2015). Additionally, the egalitarian remains self-motivated leaning towards intrinsic 
rewards and further away from extrinsic recognition. Most members state that they were 
not seeking outside recognition, but want “the best for the institution” (Green, B., 
personal communication, September 11, 2015) and the personal reward includes “helping 
a student complete their educational goals and walking the stage of graduation” (Smith, 
M., personal communication, September 10, 2015). 
Although the findings of this study may suggest that these teams operate under 
the aforementioned bias, there were several questions that members identify with the 
hierarchical viewpoint. The hierarchical viewpoint emerges as present and competing for 
prominence with the egalitarian bias. This appears to be relevant to previous research that 
states these biases are at constant struggle within individuals and groups (Lachapelle, 
Montpetit, & Gauvin, 2014; Song, Silva, & Jenkins-Smith, 2014; Wildavsky 1986). 
Threat assessment teams receive multiple streams of information regarding a student of 
concern. Each piece requires analysis of the collected information and then a 
determination made about its relevance to the total concern. Cultural Theory states 
members will decode information, analyze and make a decision according to the cultural 
bias to which they identify (Song, Silva, & Jenkins-Smith, 2014). This may explain why 
some responses associated with the hierarchical bias emerged instead of the egalitarian 
bias. For example, members stress the importance of the knowledge each person brings to 
the team and how this aids in the threat assessment, “everyone picked for this team is on 
because of position, but then also the specific background or expertise they can bring to 
the group (Smith, M., personal communication, September 10, 2015). This viewpoint 
emphasizes the importance of the credibility of experts and aligns with the hierarchical 
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lens instead of the egalitarian viewpoint. Although the threat assessment team operates 
within a value-based system, there is an equal pull from the hierarchical viewpoint for 
rule and order. This aligns to member statements such as, "following the student code and 
the established policy" (Smith, M., personal communication, September 10, 2015) and 
"security of the institution trumps all" (Smith, Q., personal communication, October 28, 
2015). These statements fall in line with a strong Grid structure. Further research needs to 
be conducted to fully determine how a team could function in competing quadrants of the 
Group-Grid model, as well as how individual perception of risk influences team 
decisions.  
Relevance of Findings to Practice 
Participants express concerns or challenges for two-year institutions moving 
forward with the threat assessment team concept. Members from one institution voice 
concerns that they are missing the critical function of a mental health counselor on the 
team. Participants from both institutions state that some positions are dually-filled as 
individuals hold multiple functions within the team. Finally, case management and record 
management appears to rudimentary, not the comprehensive tracking as required by best 
practice. Best practices may not take the two-year campus setting into consideration as a 
different or unique atmosphere because of the lack of resources. Threat assessment teams 
may not be conducive in the two-year college atmosphere. 
Team Membership 
 Although the history of the threat assessment process finds prominence in law 
enforcement, the establishment of these teams in the college and university setting did not  
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rise until after the 2007 Virginia Tech shooting. NaBita surveys colleges and universities 
every two years concerning the threat assessment process. In the NaBita 2014 survey of 
500 higher education institutions, 94 percent report having a threat assessment team with 
roughly 50 percent of these teams created in the last four years and another 44 percent 
starting within the 5-9 year range (Van Brunt, Sokolow, Lewis, Schuster, & Golston, 
2014). This data reports a high four-year institutional response at 67 percent compared to 
33 percent of two-year colleges (Van Brunt, Sokolow, Lewis, Schuster, & Golston, 
2014). The statistics report four and two-year colleges taken together and responses are 
not divided out by university type. Likewise, this survey states that 92 percent of 
respondents claim a mental health counselor serves on the team (Van Brunt, Sokolow, 
Lewis, Schuster, & Golston, 2014).  Again, this data do not decipher the breakdown of 
these numbers between two and four-year institutions. The findings in this study present 
only one institution with a mental health counselor serving on the team. This suggests 
that there is a lack of employed mental health counselors or licensed psychologists 
functioning as members of the threat assessment team at the two-year college level. 
However, more research is needed to fully support this claim as only two institutions are 
represented in this study.  The Hope/Wisconsin study suggests the two-year institution 
lacks counseling resources stating only 12 percent provide psychiatry services or other 
“license professionals on staff or contracted” (Eisenberg, Goldrick-Rabi, Lipson & 
Broton, 2016, p.4).  Additionally, most research addresses higher education at the four-
year level and does not focus on the two-year school perspective. Further research is 
needed to assess the effectiveness of these teams without all areas represented or when 




Besides team membership, best practices highlight the importance of several 
process related functions. These include areas such as case management, data records 
management, meeting consistency, and training (Randazzo & Plummer, 2007; Sokolow 
& Lewis, 2009). Participants admit to struggling with meeting consistency, with one 
institution stating they only meet “as needed, without a scheduled calendar meeting” 
(Jones, B., personal communication, October 28, 2015) and the other claiming that it 
“gets difficult at the end of the semester to meet” (Mayes, S., personal communication, 
September 11, 2015).  The NaBita survey reports that 39 percent of threat assessment 
teams meet weekly. This number declines to 12 percent for monthly meetings and 10 
percent for an “as needed” meeting (Van Brunt, Sokolow, Lewis, Schuster, & Golston, 
2014, p.1). This study did not research how frequently teams should meet for effective 
threat assessment. However, it may suggest that threat assessment teams at two-year 
schools operate differently than the four-year counterparts.  
For practice implications, meeting regularity and/or meeting cancellation may be 
connected to team complacency (Randazzo & Plummer, 2007). It is recommended that a 
regularly scheduled meeting be established for the calendar year to assure process and 
policy are followed consistently. Furthermore, to combat complacency by members, it is 
recommended that threat assessment team members continue to manage cases according 






  Participants in this study express the need for more group training related to 
threat assessment for the perspective teams. Likewise, members voice concerns of limited 
budgets, training costs, and problems with the group being absent at the same time from 
campus as reasons group training becomes difficult. Free or low-cost training appears to 
be the selected source of training for threat assessment at the two-year level. Likewise, 
teams research free whitepapers and webinars for professional development in relation to 
threat assessment (Van Brunt, Sokolow, Lewis, Schuster, & Golston, 2014). The 
participants perceive training as important and crucial to team credibility and 
effectiveness. Members state training is "pieced together in parts" (Mayes, S., personal 
communication, September 11, 2015) and "everyone focuses on training for their 
individual role" (Manning, D., personal communication, October 28, 2015), but the 
perception of value appears to surround the group focus for these individuals as members 
state group training allows for the “big picture including all components instead of being 
pieced together role by role” (Manning, D., personal communication, October 28, 2015). 
Furthermore, group training seems to be the preferred method of training for all 
individuals to hear the same information in order to develop the same process and 
reasoning to conduct assessments. None of the participants reference a line item budget 
or allocation for threat assessment training. However, all acknowledge stressed budgets 
and cost of training as a barrier for the group. Participants state their colleges suffered 




It is recommended that team members should meet to establish training needs and 
cost to request funding from administration to assure proper and adequate training for the 
group. Furthermore, group training may prove beneficial as the group moves forward 
towards one purpose and goal (Randazzo & Plummer, 2007; Van Brunt, Sokolow, Lewis, 
Schuster, & Golston, 2014). 
Team Awareness 
  Providing awareness of the team to the campus community at the two-year 
college remains a concern according to the participants. All members state a stronger 
promotional effort to the student body is needed. Furthermore, the perception that 
institutions lack a comprehensive, sustaining approach to reach the campus community 
continues to plague the threat assessment members. Participants state that most awareness  
efforts are focused towards the faculty and staff; however, statements such as "those that 
know about it" (Smith, M., personal communication, September 10, 2015) or "those that 
get involved" (Smith, Q., personal communication, October 28, 2015) may reveal the 
awareness of the campus threat assessment team continues to struggle.  The Faculty 
Senate minutes support the belief that more education of the threat assessment team is 
needed as faculty recommended that information about the threat assessment team be 
shared at faculty in-service and spring convocations. Moreover, awareness and 
promotional efforts to students center on the student handbook, Annual Security Report 
and webpage. There does not appear to be a campaign that centers on students at either 
location included in this study. Nationally, the use of Department of Homeland Security's 
"If you see something, say something" campaign reminds citizens to notify law 
enforcement if they see suspicious or questionable behavior by individuals throughout the 
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year. The integration of this familiar campaign in a different setting may aid two-year 
institutions to gain more visibility to the campus constituency. Likewise, campuses 
should promote the team for transparency purposes to the student body during 
orientations, hall meetings, first-year experience programming, website, student 
handbook, and other social media streams utilized by the campus. 
Policy Implications 
 The findings of this study provide possible implications for institutional policy 
consideration. Specifically, two-year institution administrators should investigate the true 
cost involved with operating a threat assessment team according to best practice to reduce 
foreseeability and liability for the college. Likewise, if institutions choose to operate a 
threat assessment team, written policy should include a well-defined mission statement 
that clearly expresses the safety function of the team. Furthermore, this study suggests 
that if an institution is unable to implement a threat assessment team according to best 
practice then it should not utilize a threat assessment team at all.  
Study Limitations 
 This study explored perceptions of threat assessment team members’ views 
concerning how threat assessment contributed to campus safety and the perceived 
challenges and resources afforded to the group. As this study included a low number of 
participants, the study is limited to perceptions of six individuals. Therefore, the findings 
should not be generalized to the population. Likewise, the participants included only 
current faculty and staff who served on the threat assessment team. This study did not 
take the general faculty, staff or student perceptions into consideration.  
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 The researcher voice in this study may represent a limitation as well. My voice 
includes employment background at a two-year institution, as well as chair of a threat 
assessment team. Although this provides a unique insight into threat assessment from a 
practitioner viewpoint, it may also lead to an unanticipated bias to the information. An 
opportunity for participants to review interview transcripts supplies an avenue to combat 
bias and address accuracy, validity, and trustworthiness of the data. Likewise, the 
participants’ comments serve to supply the themes that emerged from the data are 
brought forward in the interviews. 
Because this study reviewed the threat assessment team at two-year colleges, 
institutions were required to have a threat assessment team with written policy to be 
eligible for inclusion as participants. As previously stated in Chapter III, all two-year 
colleges were invited to participate in this study by email to the campus Vice President of 
Student Affairs or Student Services. Several administrators from different institutions 
initially indicated they would provide access to their threat assessment teams for possible 
participation. However, once I followed up to further explain the study two institutions 
declined to participate citing non-formalized teams or restructuring the threat assessment 
team policy or team. This resistance indicated that a qualitative study did not provide the 
needed confidentiality or anonymity needed to provide a truthful representation for these 
institutions.  
Participants indicated from their responses that they operated within an egalitarian 
bias according to Cultural Theory. These responses related to how the threat assessment 
process worked, decisions were rendered; resources attained and managed, and team 
motivations. Perceptions of Risk assignments according to Cultural Theory were 
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contemplated from a team perspective. The consideration of how an individual assessed 
risk and what Cultural Theory bias an individual used in the determination was not 
contemplated in this study. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 This study explored the perceptions of threat assessment team members at two 
institutions at the two-year college level. Research should be repeated increasing 
participants and two-year institutions to present a better understanding of the issues 
beyond the two colleges in this study. Expanding the study to include faculty, staff and 
students of the general college populations would provide varying perceptions of how 
threat assessment teams affect campus safety and if true threat assessment occurs at the 
two-year college level. Furthermore, threat assessment team research should focus on the 
two-year college environment, as most research leans heavily towards the four-year 
university with a different student body makeup. Limiting the research to this specific 
area provides further knowledge on how a threat assessment team operates at these higher 
education entities. This would add more research to the growing literature on threat 
assessment on college campuses. Additionally, by conducting a quantitative study, 
findings could be generalized to the population and provide numbers data to the types of 
student concerns managed, threat assessment team process, training and budget, and team 
characteristics within the two-year college arena. 
 Research directed towards best practices of threat assessment teams should also 
be intensified to determine effectiveness of teams without all critical roles represented 
compared to teams that incorporate all recommended roles, specifically the mental health 
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counselor. The absence or low numbers of the mental health counselor position provided 
concerns for the institutions in this study as this area may not be readily available on the 
two-year campus or mental health resources may be inadequate to service the numbers at 
the two-year level.  These data could be derived from studies about team effectiveness 
and possibly decipher if teams operated on two-year campus as directed by best practice.  
Likewise, replicating and limiting the NaBita survey for only two-year institutions would 
provide a more detailed understanding of team makeup, process, training, meeting 
consistency, and how many schools have a functioning team. Research related to what 
types of training are most beneficial for threat assessment teams and other resources 
needed should also be studied to determine a true cost of threat assessment teams on 
campus. With the continued pressure that higher education budgets experience, research 
that addressed the actual cost associated to conduct an effective threat assessment team 
for the campus could aid administration with budget development. 
 Finally, the individual perception of risk in relation to Cultural Theory and threat 
assessment teams should be studied further to determine if this theory presents 
implications for the threat assessment process. Specifically, research related to how team 
members’ perceptions of risk influences teams’ decisions and group organization may be 
helpful for decisions related to team membership selection and provide a greater 
understanding of team dynamics. Consideration of what cultural view of risk best aligned 
for team effectiveness could be studied for a better understanding of theory application. 
Although member background and expertise held importance, the knowledge of what 
cultural bias worked best for assessing risk and supported institutional goals could afford 




 This chapter discussed the findings presented in Chapter IV in relation to previous 
research, practice, and theory. Future research recommendations were also provided for 
suggestions to build upon the current research in the field. The findings of this study 
suggested that two-year institutions do not conduct threat assessment as a working threat 
assessment team according to best practice due to balancing efforts of retention and 
safety, missing critical membership roles and  struggles with meeting consistency and 
frequency. Specifically, the role of the mental health counselor appeared to be a critical 
function either missing or not meeting the recommended counseling ratios. Additionally, 
this study suggested that threat assessment team member’s desired group training to 
allow for the entire group to gain knowledge together, instead of individual training that 
was then shared secondhand. The application of the theoretical framework of Cultural 
Theory found that these two cases operated in the Egalitarian Bias within the Group - 
Grid Model; however the hierarchical bias was slightly present as both viewpoints were 
at constant struggle for dominance. Implications for practice recommendations included 
the need for group training and dedicated budget for professional development of the 
threat assessment team, employment of mental health counselors, consistent meeting 
schedule, and a comprehensive marketing plan for the team.  
 Further study is needed to understand if threat assessment teams should be 
operating on the two-year campus with the current gaps in resources. Additionally, 
further research of how an individual’s perception of risk according to Cultural Theory 
shapes decision-making in the threat assessment process would be beneficial to identify 
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Interview Protocol – Administrator Interview 
1. What is your official role on campus? 
2. How long have you been employed at this institution? 
3. What other, if any, positions have you held on campus or at other institutions? 
4. How long have you served as the TAT Chair/Administrator? 
5. What other roles have you served on the TAT? 
6. How did your campus go about developing a threat assessment team on 
campus? Was this the result of a crisis, and if so, what was the crisis? 
7. How would you describe the official policy for the threat assessment team on 
campus and can you explain it to me? 
8. How were the members selected for the threat assessment team? 
9. Who are the members of your team (positions, not names) and what are their 
roles on the TAT? What are the missing components (if any) of your team? 
10. How many cases do you typically manage on the TAT? 
11. Describe the process of how your team works from the beginning of a report 
to conclusion. 
12. Have you referred students to the TAT? 
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13. How often does your campus threat assessment team meet? 
14. What is the process for team members to follow during threat assessment 
meetings? 
15. What type of administrative support is provided to the team members to 
address any issues the team may have? 
16. What type of training is provided to the threat assessment team members? 
17. How does your written policy address reporting concerns to the threat 
assessment team? 
18. Describe the steps that you TAT uses in assessing a student concern? 
19. What does your TAT do well? 
20. What challenges does your TAT struggle with? 
21. What misconceptions as a group or as an institution have you had to face? 
How did you address these misconceptions? 
22. What record keeping processes does your threat assessment team utilize for 
this process?  
23. How has the threat assessment process been communicated to the campus 
community? 
24. How do you perceive this process has been received by the campus 
community? 
25. How would you describe the campus culture regarding TAT? 
26. As the chairperson, how do you feel about the role faculty are asked to take in 
reporting students to the TAT? 
27. What networks have been beneficial over time for the TAT? 
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28. How often does executive administration review the written policy for 
updates? 
29. How are the executive administration kept aware of the issues the threat 
assessment team are addressing in their investigations? Is this feedback loop 
(if applicable) addressed in the written policy? 
30. How has the campus culture been effected by the presence of a threat 
assessment team? 
31. In your opinion, what is needed for your TAT to run more effectively? 
Interview Protocol – Threat Assessment Team Members 
1. What is your position with the institution where you are employed? 
2. How long have you been employed at this institutions? 
3. What other, if any, positions have you held on campus or other institutions? 
4. What was the process for you to be a part of the threat assessment team? 
5. Was your involvement with the threat assessment team a choice or by 
assignment? Tell me more about this. 
6. In what capacity do you serve on the TAT? 
7. Tell me your threat assessment policy and how that relates to your team 
operations. 
8. How necessary is the TAT on your campus? 
9. What processes have been developed to aid faculty/staff to work with the TAT? 
10. What resources or trainings were provided to your team to help identify students 
in crisis? What was the name of the training? Was this training appropriate for 
you to feel properly trained and informed? 
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11. What is the leadership structure of your team process? 
12. What are the strengths of your threat assessment team? 
13. What are the weaknesses of your threat assessment team? 
14. How are decisions made about concerns brought to the threat assessment team? 
15. What is the relationship between the threat assessment team and the 
administration? 
16. How has university administrated demonstrated commitment to the TAT? 
17. How does your team communicate about concerns on campus? 
18. How does your team store information and monitor case load? 
19. What roles are represented on your threat assessment team and how do they 
contribute to the function of your team? 
20. Are there any missing components that are needed on your team to run more 
effectively? 
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